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IN THIS ISSUE

THE SHAPE OF THINGS 213

EDITORIALS

Showdown in Japan 215
No Longer Uncle Shylock 216
Anglo-American Economics *by Aylmer Vallance* 217
Giral Takes Over *by Freda Kirchwey* 218

ARTICLES

Brass Hats Undaunted *by I. F. Stone* 219
British Labor Sets Its Course *by Michael Foot* 221
China on the Brink *by T. A. Bisson* 222
Battle of the St. Lawrence *by Benjamin J. Atlas* 224
In the Wind 226

POLITICAL WAR

The New Spanish Cabinet *by J. Alvarez Del Vayo* 227
Yugoslav Democracy, Limited *by Hal Lehrman* 228

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

The Face in the Mountain *by James Grossman* 230
The Problem of Influence *by Lionel Trilling* 234
Briefer Comment 234
Music *by B. H. Haggin* 237

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS 238

CROSSWORD PUZZLE No. 125 *by Jack Barrett* 240

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The Shape of Things

GERMANY'S SURRENDER WAS A PIECEMEAL affair, bloody and disorderly. The leading characters fled for their lives or were seized or lay dead or disfigured in the midst of rubble. There was little ceremony about it. Terror had collapsed in terror, and the end seemed ugly and appropriate. The surrender of Japan was different. It was accomplished with a certain pomp and elegance. It went off smoothly; people played the roles history had clearly designed for them. A sense of dramatic fitness controlled the performance as in a well-directed drama. But perhaps because of this very fact the whole thing was a little gruesome. Correspondents had to keep reminding their readers that behind all this decorum lay the long, ugly slaughter stretching down the years from Japan's first thrust into Manchuria. Nothing decorous about any of it: the systematic job of destruction, rape, and massacre at Nanking; the elaborate sham of negotiation with an unready, gullible America, ending abruptly when the bombers arrived over Pearl Harbor; the death march of Bataan; the inhuman jungle fighting, without even a pretense of mercy or honor on either side.... The Japanese generals were polite and solemn; the Japanese officials cooperative, ready to play their new role of superperfect hosts to a conquering army. Everybody, from the top to somewhere near the bottom, is all set to show that the war was just a little error, a temporary misunderstanding, soon to be expiated, soon to be forgiven, and thereafter the Son of Heaven and all his minions can be left in charge and business can go on as usual during repairs.... Correspondents report that the Japanese are bitter about American bombings, but when you mention Nanking or Manila they look pained, as if you had made an awkward slip of the tongue. Surely the uninvited guest knows better than that! But Admiral Halsey expressed emotions that must have boiled through the veins of most of his fellow-countrymen during these last few days when he said he would "have liked to kick each Japanese delegate in the face." Not elegant. Not polite. But very exact and satisfying—and somehow reassuring.

*

WE WELCOME THE HINT FROM STETTINIUS IN London that the United States and Great Britain may be prepared to share the secret of the atomic bomb with our allies and to place its development under the control of the new United Nations Organization. We agree with the Russian publication, *New Times*, that since the fundamental principles are known "it is simply a question of time before any country will be able to produce atomic bombs." Under such conditions war would be suicidal, and the *reductio ad ab-*

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surdum of the nationalistic attitude is the New York *Daily News* editorial suggesting "two atomic bombs for one." Presumably if our enemies destroy us once, we would destroy them twice! We are glad to see that Senator Pepper has raised his voice against the attempt to make the atomic bomb an Anglo-American monopoly. Altogether too little thinking is being done about the implications of the atomic bomb for warfare and for the future of society. Ultimately it will render both present war strategy and capitalism obsolete. In the meantime we would like to suggest a special commission to study the effects of the atomic bombing in Japan and the rushing of medical aid for Japanese civilians terribly burned (despite bland War Department denials) by the radioactive after-effects of atomic detonation.

✶

HOPES OF A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC solution to China's domestic problems were stirred as we went to press. There were indications that behind the scenes the United States and the Soviet Union may have insisted that Chiang make peace with the Chinese Communists and establish a democratic regime at home as the price for the Sino-Soviet pact and the return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty. The tone of the Russian press, the statement made by T. V. Soong at Ottawa, Chiang's agreement to postpone the People's Congress and to make it somewhat more representative, give promise that his current talks with Mao Tse-tung may yet be fruitful. American policy in this situation remains far from clear. Although there is one report that Chiang has agreed to permit the Chinese Communists to accept the surrender of Japanese troops in certain areas, our planes are still transporting Kuomintang soldiers into Yenan's territory and American correspondents have been prevented from covering these unusual military activities. By utilizing American planes and American personnel to ferry Kuomintang troops deep into Communist areas, Generals Wedemeyer and Hurley may be asking for trouble. Clashes are bound to arise in regions where conflict would otherwise have been physically impossible. If American soldiers are killed in these clashes, the incident would, as Mr. Bisson points out in his article in this issue, provide fuel for a "red scare" that would play into the hands of the Russia-hating press. Russia has deliberately adopted a hands-off policy in the China crisis, presumably out of a desire to strengthen United Nations unity. But American intervention is potentially just as dangerous to Allied unity as Russian intervention would be.

✶

NO ONE AT ALL FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY THE minds of most officials and big business men operate—both prefer ballyhoo to candor in dealing with the public—can fail to be impressed with the job that the Office of War Information did. Elmer Davis collected a staff which included some of the ablest newspapermen in the country, and they succeeded, despite heart-breaking difficulties, in providing press and public with more honest information about what was going on than has been vouchsafed any other country in any other war. On every side, from the big dollar-a-year men of the War Production Board to the dodos of the State Department, Davis and his young men were surrounded by bigwigs to whom double-talk came natural. Almost every press release and every major report had to be cleared through several agencies dominated by just such mentalities, and it is a miracle that the resultant product was as informative as it was. That the OWI should be abolished at this time, when we more than ever need an agency to interpret our ways to the world, is a tragic consequence of the obscurantist partisanship which made OWI the butt of Congress and the rightist press. The international information functions of the OWI and of the Office of Inter-American Affairs are to be transferred to an "Interim International Information Service" in the State Department. If the President is wise, he will leave that vestigial agency in the State Department for the interim only. The stodgy ways, musty atmosphere, and un-American outlook that continue to pervade that department make it totally unsuited to the task of interpreting America for foreign countries. At the very least, if this agency is to stay in the State Department, the President ought to appoint a man of Archibald MacLeish's ability, stature, and imagination to handle international information and give him ample power to keep free of bureaucratic barnacles.

✶

SPRUILLE BRADEN'S MASTERLY ADDRESS ON THE anatomy of fascism which he delivered at a luncheon of the Argentine-American Cultural Institute in Buenos Aires was also his first speech as Assistant Secretary of State. We can't help feeling that as such it must have fluttered the tail coats in the State Department. "Let no one imagine," concluded Mr. Braden, "that my being transferred to Washington means the abandonment of the task I have undertaken. The voice of freedom makes itself heard in this land and I do not believe anyone will succeed in drowning it. I shall hear it from Washington with the same clarity with which I heard it in Buenos Aires." Certainly what we need is diplomatic officials who can hear the voice of freedom even through the State Department's thick walls of protocol, precedent, and plain reaction. We hope that Mr. Braden's hearing remains unimpaired and also that his appointment represents a change of policy toward the voice of freedom whether it rises from Argentina or, say, Franco's Spain.

✶

PERON WILL FALL WITHIN THE MONTH IF political developments in Argentina continue at their present pace. The middle-of-the road Radicals, last to oppose him, hope to be first to replace him and they may succeed. We do not think the State Department would object. But since the best-laid plans of ministers are sometimes ruined by determined men, the Argentines may confound conservative elements both in our country and in their own. Several hours after Braden's biting denunciation of the Perón regime the Radicals finally agreed to join the United Democratic Front which includes all opposition parties—on condition that they retain full independence and autonomy and that the Conservatives and anti-Personalists are excluded. The next step is up to the United Front, which, unless the Radicals withdraw their objections, will have to decide which group to exclude. Meanwhile Socialists, Communists, and Radicals held large independent rallies last week, the first since the lifting

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of the state of siege. And last week also, a second group of exiled democratic leaders came back to Argentina to help liberate their homeland. Perón was afraid to order his police to attack them as he did the week before when the first group of leftist opposition leaders returned. The militant strike of teachers and students and the fact that British Labor government may be counted on to withdraw support from Perón are other factors hastening the dénouement. Meanwhile Perón is not idle. According to one rumor he plans a coup in which Farrell will be replaced by a renegade Radical or by a military figure such as General Avalos who will permit Perón to keep on pulling the strings. As opposing forces prepare for the showdown one fact is evident. A conservative, fairly democratic government dominated by the large landholders and livestock producers and dedicated to the establishment of a stable government of minimal democracy would not displease certain elements in our State Department. And if the people of Argentina are not careful that is what they may get.

✶

GOVERNOR DEWEY IS THE REAL OFFENDER IN the Campbell case. He was the glamorous district attorney who missed his goal of a record of 100 percent in convictions by only 2 per cent. And it was his office that in 1938 brought about the conviction of Bernard Campbell for a crime he never committed. Detective Woods, who arrested Campbell when ordered to do so, always doubted his guilt and was instrumental in bringing the true culprit to justice. Some restitution has been made to Campbell for the forty months he spent in Sing Sing by Governor Dewey's executive pardon. At public hearings held last week by the New York County Criminal Courts Bar Association, Robert Daru, the association's counsel, showed that key witnesses were coached before the trial and that the State Parole Board had not, as it asserted, interviewed all persons of any consequence in the case. He charged that, despite the pardon, Campbell had not received full justice either from Governor Dewey or from the state parole authority. For attached to the pardon was a board report saying that it was "impossible today to establish with certainty" Campbell's innocence. This despite the fact that another man had confessed to the forgery of which Campbell was falsely convicted. Mr. Campbell's name has been cleared to our satisfaction—but Mr. Dewey's has not.

✶

CHICAGO IS THE FIRST CITY IN THE UNITED States to outlaw racial discrimination in matters of employment. Last week the City Council adopted a Fair Employment Practice ordinance that makes it a misdemeanor for an employer to refuse to employ or for a union to refuse to admit any person because of race, creed, color, or national origin. Violations will be prosecuted in the Municipal Court by the City Prosecutor. Ira Latimer, executive director of the Chicago Civil Liberties Union, which drafted and introduced the ordinance, has stressed its special importance at this time in view of the vast public-projects program about to be initiated in Chicago. The ordinance, a model of brevity and clarity, states that "whereas . . . the democratic way of life within the nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders, the City of Chicago, to cooperate with the United States Government by eliminating discrimination in public and private employment, enacts this ordinance. . . ." Not only do acts of discrimination in hiring, promotions, wage increases, tenure, and conditions of employment come under the classification of misdemeanors. But in Chicago it is now also unlawful to seek information concerning the race, color, religion, origin, or ancestry of any employee as a condition of employment and to place help-wanted advertisements based on such discrimination. Chicago has broken fresh ground in the fight for minority rights.

Showdown in Japan

THE next few days may provide a clue as to whether we shall have peace or merely a protracted truce in the Pacific. Now that the surrender has been signed and Allied troops are well established in the heart of the Japanese empire, the nature of our basic policy toward the defeated enemy will rapidly become evident. So far—until the signing of the formal documents—our policies have been amazingly soft, especially when compared with our treatment of Germany after its capitulation. We chose to work through the Emperor in the hope of effecting a bloodless entry into the Japanese home islands. This policy is defensible on the ground that it has saved American lives, even though it inevitably gave an impression of conciliating the authorities. But now that the occupation has been accomplished, General MacArthur must act decisively to eradicate the sources of Japanese militarism or he will find that the opportunity has eluded him altogether.

It is evident that the Japanese government is striving to make our occupation as painless as possible in the hope that MacArthur may be tempted to leave the existing governmental and economic machinery intact rather than risk anarchy in an endeavor to set up direct Allied control over every aspect of Japanese life. So far the Japanese have been embarrassingly passive and polite. Correspondents have complained that the occupation has often taken on the atmosphere of a tea party. And the government has complacently gone about its task of substituting "democracy" for totalitarian rule. The militarist Premier Higashi-Kuni has announced that a general election will soon be called, and that restrictions on the freedom of the press and assembly will soon be lifted. Textbooks to be used in the schools will be carefully purged, not by the Allied occupation authorities, but by the Japanese government itself.

Thus the Japanese hope to achieve by guile what they could not possibly have achieved by prolonged and fanatical resistance, and the danger is that they will succeed. George E. Jones, a correspondent of the New York *Times*, reported from Okinawa that the Allied military administration intends, unless events force a change, to channel its orders through Emperor Hirohito, his Cabinet, and the prefectural and local governments. As there has been no official statement of policy, this dispatch may merely represent one correspondent's gloomy reaction to developments prior to occupation. But if this is to be our policy, it means that the

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groups in Japan that are responsible for the war—the superpatriots, the *Zaibatsu,* and the landlords who have dominated Japanese policy for many years—will retain their dominant position. A few war criminals might have to commit *hara-kiri*—for the crime of losing the war, not for starting it—but the feudal political and social structure which is the root cause of Japanese militarism would not only remain intact but continue to be dominated by the individuals who led the world to disaster. What started out to be a policy of accepting the Emperor as an instrument for facilitating surrender would thus end in our accepting all the evils which the Japanese throne embodies.

Nothing that General MacArthur has done to date deserves such harsh judgment. He has gone about the task of arranging the occupation and formal surrender in a business-like manner. He has yet to show his hand toward the Emperor, the present Cabinet, or the other war criminals. He is known to bear little love for the Japanese, and it is doubtful that he is greatly impressed by their excessive politeness and subservience. But MacArthur's virtues are of a military rather than a political order. His actions in the first fortnight of occupation will reveal whether he is likely to be outmaneuvered in peace by an enemy that was his inferior in battle.

MacArthur's first step after establishing his position thoroughly enough to enforce his will should be to dismiss the present Cabinet and arrest Higashi-Kuni and several other of its members as war criminals. It is a militarist government and, as long as it remains in power, our anti-militarist protestations will lack moral force. After eliminating the hold of the military and their associates on the government, the Allied Supreme Commander should turn his attention to the task of demilitarizing Japanese industry. This will involve the establishment of new forms of ownership and control. For in Japan, even more than in Germany, the industrialist class was actively responsible for the war. Only by making it impossible for them to recover their control over industry can we hope to destroy the foundations of Japanese militarism. Punishment of the active warmakers will probably not be such a difficult task. Through defeat they have already forfeited their standing as individuals in Japanese society. Suppression of the hundreds of patriotic societies, which played such an active part in whipping up the war fever, presents much greater difficulties. These societies will doubtless go underground and will probably be able to escape detection unless the occupation authorities are successful in developing a genuinely anti-militarist regime in Tokyo capable of dealing with them.

The discovery and enlisting of democratic groups within Japan that can be counted on to oppose the revival of militarism is perhaps the greatest challenge that faces the Allied Supreme Commander. Obviously, he will not find them within the present government or in any high civil or business posts. A few anti-war leaders may be found in prison or in exile, but Japan did not even keep its opposition leaders in concentration camps where they would be easily available for our use. Most of the men who opposed the war openly in 1937 are now believed to be dead. Yet if we are to credit the dispatches of the correspondents who visited Tokyo and nearby Japanese cities, the common people of Japan are pathetically glad that the war is over. If a vote could be taken today, the anti-war sentiment would undoubtedly be far greater than it was in the 1937 elections when the anti-militarist groups outvoted the war parties. But in a land accustomed to dictatorial rule, the undercurrent of popular unrest may not become apparent until the present militarist regime is driven from power. Waiting for this latent democratic force to develop into a constructive movement capable of regenerating Japan may prolong the occupation for many months or years beyond the short period now being considered. But it is the only alternative to handing Japan back to the groups that even now are probably studying the Pearl Harbor documents to find out how they can improve on their treachery next time.

No Longer Uncle Shylock

EVERY American who understands what this war has cost our Allies will be grateful to President Truman for his frankness in disavowing any intention to collect the $42,000,000,000 we have supplied our Allies on lend-lease, and for his reminder that the cost of the war is to be measured "in blood and toil . . . in the immeasurable wreckage of human lives . . . and cities" as well as in dollars. These are far cries from the "they hired the money, didn't they?" of Coolidge and refreshingly distinct also from the involved double-talk with which the Truman statement was followed by Byrnes. Our allies matched those dollars with sacrifices more precious than money, and we have already had our value received. Our cities were not bombed; our children were not maimed; our country was not ravaged. We bought time with lend-lease, and the race between the Western powers and the Reich to develop the atomic bomb is only the most dramatic example of how crucial a factor time was. Had our allies weakened or crumpled and given the Germans more time, New York and Washington might well have suffered the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Let us not forget that in discussions of lend-lease.

We alone of the fighting United Nations have emerged from the war enriched by the conflict, and there could be no uglier spectacle than an attempt by the richest of the partners to insist on heavy payments from the poor. But economic good sense as well as equity dictates the cancellation of the lend-lease payments. We are desperately in need of an expanding world market for the wares of our war-expanded industry, and the world market can only be restricted by any attempt to pile $42,000,000,000 in debt on top of the other difficulties of Britain, Russia, France, the Netherlands, and China, the principal recipients of lend-lease. Markets are more important to us than money; markets mean employment, while collection of lend-lease debts, even if possible, would merely add to our squirrel's horde of gold in Tennessee. Some of this we learned after the last war, and it is our good fortune and the world's that President Roosevelt, in framing the lend-lease program, planned in advance just the action foreshadowed by President Truman's statement.

Mr. Roosevelt was very clever in circumventing prejudice and economic ignorance. Aid to the Allies was launched not as a loan or as a gift but as "lend-lease," a completely new

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phrase pulled out of the hat by that master of political prestidigitation. The text of the enabling act as prepared at the White House and passed by Congress provided that the "terms and conditions" for granting aid were to be "those which the President deems satisfactory," and the compensation "may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." Congress was reconciled from the beginning to the idea that there would never be repayment in dollars, and Truman, thanks to his predecessor, has ample power to make a magnanimous settlement. Under the circumstances his bold and open declaration looking toward cancellation is preferable to the small-minded trickiness with which Byrnes tried to save some of our "bargaining power." Our bargaining power lies in our enormous economic assets. This power will be enhanced by a generous attitude that will command world respect. It can only be diminished and ill feeling provoked by haggling.

Let us also remember that as bad as an attempt to collect on lend-lease in dollars and cents would be an attempt to use our superior economic power as a bludgeon to force on others economic policies largely of advantage to ourselves. We must permit other countries the benefits of transitional tariff and currency arrangements, such as those of the sterling bloc, if we are to achieve freer trade conditions under circumstances beneficial to weaker countries as well as the United States. And it would also be well to remember, in the midst of our self-righteous talk about free trade (utterly forgetful of our high tariffs and continued export bounties) that the key to world prosperity lies not in breaking up British imperial preferences or lowering other people's tariffs but in the achievement of full employment at home. If we, the Midas of the world, learn to use our wealth, if our men and machines are fully occupied, the resultant prosperity will spill in an unheeding flood over such minor obstacles as tariff walls and currency difficulties.

Anglo-American Economics

BY AYLMER VALLANCE

[*Mr. Vallance is* The Nation's *London correspondent.*]

London, August 30 (By cable)

HUMAN nature being perverse, benefactors commonly share with creditors a measure of unpopularity. Candor compels me to report that the United States, to which Britain owes its present position as a victorious albeit impoverished nation, is spoken of here today in somewhat the same accents as Frenchmen spoke of *les Anglais* in 1919. No one enjoys being a poor relation, and the tendency to view America's preponderant strength and wealth with the green eye of jealousy is accentuated by press dispatches from less responsible British correspondents in the United States featuring the post-war abundance to be found in your department stores and ignoring altogether your unsolved problem of under-employment. Candor also forces the admission that the voice of Rotary-lunching Brother Jonathan proclaiming the American Century grates slightly on the ears of Britishers anxious to forget nineteenth-century British economic imperialism.

This said, it is important to emphasize that there is absolutely no resentment in this country—least of all on the left—at the President's decision to terminate lend-lease. The right, of course, is secretly jubilant. Taking the cue from Wall Street's *bel ami,* Lyttelton, Conservatives are exaggerating with disingenuous gloom "the gravity of the blow." Their hope is that either the government will be forced to give priority to an individualist export drive at the cost of deferring socialist measures, or that if United States credits "with strings on them" are declined and consumers here are required to tighten their belts and forgo Virginia cigarettes, the public will grumble and blame the Cabinet.

But among Labor M.P.'s, and this goes for the mass of the government's supporters in the country, I can assert with assurance that the dominant sentiment is one of relief that we must face realities squarely, here and now, and that the day of reckoning cannot be postponed—as Churchill, with his Micawber-like propensities, would certainly have postponed it—at the cost of entanglement through further financial indebtedness.

By this I don't mean that Lord Keynes has instructions to reject any and every offer Leo T. Crowley may make of temporary accommodation to cover part, at least, of lend-lease goods in pipeline. Were that the government's decision, they would scarcely have sent Keynes across the Atlantic to announce it. Indeed, the foreshadowed abrupt end of mutual aid, unless slightly cushioned, involves consequences disadvantageous both to Britain and to the United States.

We can get through this economic Dunkirk. Though Britain's over-all balance of external payments, with a deficit running to an annual rate of about four billion dollars, presents a pretty grim picture, and the manner in which we have drawn on the resources of the sterling area (already creditors for nearly fifteen billion dollars in blocked London balances) recalls uncomfortably the methods of Dr. Schacht, we can at least economize our own expenditures of dollars. Last year, against exports to the United States worth eighty million dollars, we imported American goods, excluding munitions, costing over two billions. But two-fifths of this total was represented by petrol, obtainable henceforth from Iran, Iraq, and Trinidad, while as for the other big items, meat and dairy produce, timber, machinery, tobacco, we can switch our imports largely to other sources or go without.

Some dollars, of course, we must spend. We are determined to play a full part in the relief and reconstruction of Europe, and this, given our present scarcity of goods, involves purchases on the Continent's behalf in the United States. Certain American goods, notably raw cotton, are indispensable, and others are urgently needed for our industrial reconversion. Partially, we can draw on our present holdings in dollars, estimated here at nearly two billions. Proportionately, we should impair our ability to put dollars for the purchase of United States goods at the disposal of our sterling area creditors—a point which Crowley is unlikely to overlook. But in a pinch we can draw on those holdings. Certainly the left

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here would expect the government to do so in preference to incurring financial obligations in Washington without the assurance of an American commercial policy which would enable us to repay them.

That, in fact, is the crux of the present issue of Anglo-American economic relations. The British are uninformed as to whether the men controlling United States policy yet realize not only that America, as a creditor nation, must have a future permanent import surplus but that all Europe, including Britain, has adopted a socialist economy in which foreign trade becomes a matter not of the old-fashioned financial checks and balances of laisser faire but of planned interchange of physical goods. The British government, like that of the U. S. S. R., will undoubtedly sign the Bretton Woods agreement, but, like the Russians, will sign with the explicit reservation that our imports and exports must be state-controlled. We have no desire to impoverish ourselves by adopting "Sinn Fein for Socialism" nor any idea of ring-fencing the sterling area against the inroads of American commerce. But we must face the fact that our resources are temporarily as straitened as in 1940, and must be carefully husbanded in order to command enough raw materials for full employment and enough essential foods for our workers. The summary end of lend-lease brings us sharply up against the realization that our foreign-balance payments are the prime factor necessitating socialist planning. It will be planning for expansion, not restriction, but planning, state-directed, it must be.

Giral Takes Over

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

IT WOULD be useless to pretend that the solution reached by the Spaniards in Mexico is a satisfactory one. The new government, dominated as it is by rightist republican elements, has been received without enthusiasm. José Giral, the Prime Minister, is a colorless person, a man of little force or capacity for leadership, and his Cabinet is almost as pallid. Its outstanding member, Angel Ossorio y Gallardo, is also the most conservative. One can hardly imagine that such a government will be able to rally the republican rank and file, in Spain and in exile, for a united stand against Franco. Nor does it represent a majority of the organized political groups in Mexico. Of the nineteen parties and organizations consulted by President Martinez Barrio, ten urged a government headed by Dr. Juan Negrín. Whether the Giral Cabinet will win the necessary two-thirds vote in the coming Cortes meeting remains to be seen. Even if it does, the result will be a legal rather than an actual political indorsement. For the Cortes itself, elected before the Franco rebellion, has since been dispersed among the various countries of refuge and has lost more than a hundred members through death, mostly at the hands of Franco's assassins. Those who can be assembled in Mexico, even if they make up a quorum, can hardly be said to represent the people of Spain or even the Spaniards in exile.

To express the actual political tendencies among the republican forces, the new government would have to include the group of parties and organizations which composed the Negrín government, including particularly the two chief labor federations. This it has failed to do. The reasons why Negrín and his associates have refused to enter the Giral Cabinet are explained on another page in a dispatch from Mexico by J. Alvarez del Vayo, former Foreign Minister. Undoubtedly there are aspects of the situation which Mr. del Vayo cannot yet discuss in detail. But he makes it plain that the abstention of those groups was based on considerations of policy rather than on factional hostility. They accept the new government as the legal government of the Spanish Republic but refuse to assume responsibility for policies they do not approve. In making this decision they have shown both restraint and political wisdom.

If the groups which dominate the Giral regime had adopted the same attitude toward the Cabinet headed by Negrín, instead of repudiating it and setting up "juntas" in opposition, the republican government would long ago have commanded recognition and support abroad. The Negrín government was of course based on far firmer constitutional ground than is the new regime, since it was legally established in Spain and had received a unanimous vote of confidence at the last Cortes meeting on Spanish soil; its weakness arose solely from the attacks of dissident elements. Now that the new government has been built, in large part around these same elements, the Negrínists have adopted the magnanimous and extremely difficult role of "loyal opposition." There is little tradition in Spanish politics to support this role even in normal times; to carry it through in exile, after years of acute political division, will demand high qualities of statesmanship.

But the attempt is worth making, and it is the logical sequel to Dr. Negrín's whole course in Mexico. For, paradoxically, Negrín himself created the situation which brought Giral to power: he went to Mexico determined to turn the problem of the government over to the parties and at the same time to create the constitutional instruments through which a change in the government could legally be effected. The procedure followed was agreed upon after long and patient negotiation with the party leaders. The result is a tribute to the moral stature of Negrín. He is no longer Prime Minister, but it is a safe guess that his influence has grown rather than diminished.

Inevitably under the circumstances, the new Cabinet takes office in an atmosphere of skepticism. It must prove its strength before the Cortes meets in October, and one of the chief tests of its capacity to function as a government in exile will be its success in winning the recognition of other governments. Mexico established relations promptly with the Giral regime, and it is significant that this first diplomatic point was scored after President Avila Camacho had consulted privately with Dr. Negrín. Of one thing we may be certain: If Giral fails it will not be through any political act of his predecessor; his government will be given every possible chance to carry out the task for which it was chosen. Negrín is neither a saint nor a martyr; but he loves Spain and desires the restoration of the Republic more than he loves or desires power.

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Brass Hats Undaunted

BY I. F. STONE

THE report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on Pearl Harbor begins by explaining that the Pacific Fleet was organized in three main task forces. The operating schedule was so arranged that there was always one task force at sea, and usually two. "At no time during 1941," the Court of Inquiry assures us, "were all the vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor." In accordance with this operating schedule, only Task Force One and part of Task Force Two were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack. Reading thus far, one feels that naval operations were wisely planned to avoid a situation in which the entire Pacific Fleet might have been destroyed in one enemy attack on the Hawaiian base. But then we read that "the preponderance of the battleship strength of the Fleet" was in Task Force One, and that all three of the battleships of Task Force Two were also in the harbor, and finally that "all battleships of the Pacific Fleet, except one undergoing overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in Pearl Harbor on 7 December." The Naval Court of Inquiry concludes, however, that this was "purely a coincidence." The disingenuous approach and the fatuous conclusion are alike characteristic of the report turned in by the three high admirals, Kalbfus, Murfin, and Andrews.

Despite this solemn rigmarole about the three task forces, the fact is that the Japanese attack had the effect, as the Army Board of Inquiry reports, "of immobilizing and substantially destroying the Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan's left flank in its southward move." To dismiss as "coincidence" the crucial blunder that concentrated all our battleships and most of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor that ghastly morning is to demonstrate the continued presence in the armed services of the brass-hat mentality responsible for that disaster. Admirals and generals are supposed to avoid "coincidences" of this kind when they know war is an imminent possibility, as they knew in the fall of 1941.

On a par with this Naval Court of Inquiry conclusion is its finding that "condition of readiness No. 3," in effect at the time of the attack, was "that best suited to the circumstances." This deserves to rank with the medical gag about the operation being highly successful though the patient died. It draws from Admiral King the tart comment that "condition of readiness No. 3" is that "normally maintained in port." In other words the high admirals of the Court of Inquiry still think the condition of readiness observed by a ship in Brooklyn in peacetime was "best suited" to the circumstances in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This finding will read better in Japanese.

As can be seen from these samples, the naval report on Pearl Harbor is hardly a masterpiece of forthright self-criticism. The report of the Army Board of Inquiry is by comparison a vigorous and outspoken document. The mealy-mouthed naval report is accompanied by separate statements from Admiral King, as commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and from Secretary Forrestal. Both King and Forrestal indicate their displeasure with the Court of Inquiry and speak out with manly frankness on the navy's responsibility for Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, the army board's report is accompanied by a separate statement by Secretary Stimson which seeks to soften the criticism in that document and to rebut findings which place on the General Staff in Washington and on General Marshall, its chief, a substantial share of the blame for our unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor. The net effect of the reports and their accompanying statements is to leave the impression that the services as a whole are still far from prepared fully to admit the errors which made Pearl Harbor possible. That attitude does not promise well for the future.

Both the army and navy reports do a great deal of buck-passing. The prize specimen is the naval court's finding that "constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress" made it difficult to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor. This was neatly deflated in Secretary Forrestal's dour retort, "The constitutional inhibition . . . did not preclude long-distance reconnaissance." The army board's report blames the state of public opinion and isolationism, but itself contains isolationist overtones; noteworthy is the statement, in discussing contradictory tendencies at home, "we were arming our forces for war and at the same time giving away much of such armament." Both reports have given fuel to the isolationist press by blaming Secretary Hull for not continuing to stall and appease the Japanese in the fall of 1941. That public opinion bears a heavy share in the responsibility for Pearl Harbor is indisputable, but irrelevant. For the question before the army and navy boards was whether the armed services did all they could to prevent the disaster *with the means at their disposal* and within the existing circumstances. The answer to that question is sharply negative. It is only the criticism of Hull, and by implication Roosevelt, which merits serious consideration.

Hull is blamed for presenting his ten-point proposal to the Japanese on November 26, 1941, over the objections of General Marshall as Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations. Marshall and Stark, supported by Stimson and Knox, said we were unprepared for war and seemed to feel that Hull's proposals were so drastic as to make war unavoidable. It is implied that Roosevelt ignored or overruled this warning. But it is hard to see how Hull could have stalled the Japanese any longer without in large part accepting their proposals of November 20, and those proposals would have made us a partner in Japanese aggression. The Japs wanted us to supply them with all the oil they needed, to unfreeze Japanese accounts in this country, to end all aid to China, to "cooperate" with Japan in acquiring "those goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Neth-

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erlands East Indies." To accept such terms would have been to risk the complete collapse of China and the dominance of the Dutch East Indies by Japan. There was no assurance that paying this kind of blackmail would have prevented further Japanese advances and an eventual attack upon us anyway. It is to the credit of Hull and Roosevelt that they refused to participate in a Far Eastern Munich and insisted, in the ten-point proposal, on the evacuation of China as a condition for resuming friendly relations with Japan.

The army and navy wanted more time, but we had already been stalling and appeasing the Japanese for ten years. The price asked for more time was so large that it would have benefited Japan more than the United States. The refusal to pay that price undoubtedly precipitated the long-prepared Japanese attack, and we were poorly prepared for war. But the real point involved in the Pearl Harbor inquiry was whether that disaster need necessarily have happened. And one test of the army-navy plea for more time is what use the armed services made of the time they did have. The services regarded the ten-point proposal as a virtual ultimatum to Japan, and since they so regarded the proposal they were under obligation to take steps immediately for war. But their record, as disclosed in the army and navy inquiries and in the earlier Roberts report, is one of unpardonable negligence and appalling stupidity. We would have had to fight a defensive war for months in any case, but we need not have lost our Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and our air force at Manila in two quick, crushing surprise attacks. For the facts disclosed indicate that it was not a lack of knowledge but sheer stodgy unimaginative bureaucratic complacency at Washington, Pearl Harbor, and Manila which made the Japanese blitz possible.

In the first place, the joint army-navy defense plan for Hawaii signed on April 9, 1941, was, as the army board said, "prophetic in its accuracy." It was based on the assumption that the Japs would attack without warning, and the men who drew up that plan accurately forecast every basic detail of what happened at Pearl Harbor: the time of day, the type of task force used by the Japanese, the form the attack would take, even the fact that it might be preceded (as it actually was) by a single submarine foray in the harbor just before the big blow. The only trouble is that this army-navy defense agreement was neither implemented nor taken seriously by the military-naval command in Washington and in Hawaii. In the second place, President Roosevelt told the heads of the army and navy at a White House conference on November 25, the day before the ten-point proposal, to expect a surprise attack "perhaps as soon as next Monday," which was December 1. In the third place, from the time of that White House conference until December 7, "the record shows" (says the army report) "that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions." Finally, at 9 o'clock on the morning of December 7, the War and Navy Departments were tipped off (four hours before the attack) that the Japanese would present an ultimatum or declaration of war at 1 p. m. Washington time. And a Commander Kramer in the navy was quick to point out that 1 p. m. Washington time would be dawn at Pearl Harbor, the very time at which our war plans predicted a surprise attack there.

General Marshall as Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations failed to see to it that proper defense measures were taken at Pearl Harbor between November 25 and December 7. And they failed to react quickly enough to the advance knowledge that they had on the morning of Pearl Harbor. Stark didn't think the information was worth passing on and Marshall sent it to General Short by commercial cable when faster means of communication were available. The last warning left Washington 22 minutes before the attack and did not arrive until several hours after the attacking force had departed. Marshall could have telephoned Short, but his excuse was that he was expecting an attack in the Philippines rather than in Hawaii and telephoned MacArthur instead. This throws additional light on MacArthur's extraordinary incompetence as a commander at that juncture. For despite the pleas of subordinates to disperse his planes, MacArthur left them on the ground at Clark Field outside Manila, where almost his entire air force was destroyed by the Japanese ten hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor. MacArthur was more culpable than Kimmel and Short, and it is scandalous that there should never have been an investigation of his bungling in the Philippines.

Our military-naval command acted with indecent sedateness. Lacking daring itself, it did not expect daring from the Japanese. Even now, when we know how meticulously and minutely (and, let us confess, brilliantly) the Japanese planned their attacks, we still find the Army Board of Inquiry talking nonsense about "the Oriental mind" and attributing the Pearl Harbor blitz to "the violent and uncivilized reasoning of the Japanese." Our military-naval command did not keep abreast of new developments in warfare, notably the use of torpedoes from planes in shallow water. This was how the Japs did most of their damage at Pearl Harbor, and naval intelligence warned of this possibility months in advance. Our military-naval command underestimated the intelligence of the Japanese and they made the equally crucial mistake of underestimating the loyalty of our Japanese-American population. For it was the latter error which led General Short to institute the alert against sabotage instead of the alert against attack from without. Under this type of alert planes were parked wing to wing and unable to get off the ground in less than four hours. The attack on Pearl Harbor took only three, and most of the planes were destroyed.

Perhaps the crowning example of military stupidity is in the revelation that while our army's mobile anti-aircraft artillery was in state of instant readiness, it had no ammunition. The ammunition was in a crater a mile away. General Short and Ordnance had rejected pleas for artillery shells several days earlier on the ground that "they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, and have to take it back in later on and renovate it." The slogan of the Pearl Harbor high command seems to have been, "Praise the Lord, but don't muss the ammunition."

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British Labor Sets its Course

BY MICHAEL FOOT

[*Mr. Foot is a new Labor member of Parliament, having defeated Leslie Hore-Belisha in the recent election. He was formerly acting editor of the London* Evening Standard, *and covered the San Francisco conference for the London* Daily Herald.]

London, August 29 (By cable)

THE new British government has been in power a little more than a month. No government in British history, with the exception of Mr. Churchill's Administration, which came into office when Hitler's panzers were smashing through the Ardennes, has ever confronted more serious economic and social problems during its first weeks of authority.

Coal stocks are much more meager than a year ago and the nation only survived last winter with the utmost economy. Stern warnings have had to be given that the allowances of food and clothes cannot be increased and may have to be diminished; and this unhappy news was broken to a people who were just beginning to hope that some relief might be granted after the bitter endurance of the past six years. Eagerness to be demobilized is being vigorously expressed by the servicemen; their demands cannot yet be satisfied by a government which is resolved not to cast away the fruits of victory through a failure to execute military commitments or through a disorderly and unjust demobilization plan.



Bevin

All these pressures were urgent enough before the news was announced that lend-lease was to be terminated. Mr. Attlee's revelation had little of the drama of Mr. Churchill's call for "blood, toil, tears, and sweat" in 1940, but it must figure in the records as a hardly less historic proclamation. Britain in the next few years must adopt the psychology of the Soviet five-year plans. Present rewards must be postponed with the purpose of making secure future enjoyment. The success of the new government in appealing for a gigantic productive effort will depend on its capacity to convince the people of its good faith in carrying out measures for insuring a fairer distribution of the new wealth still to be created. It is a formidable summons, but the survival of democratic government not only in Britain is the stake.

How is the government succeeding in the invocation of this spirit? The King's speech which outlined the government's plans for legislative action was a good beginning. The minority Labor government of 1929 worked on the assumption that bold measures should be postponed until economic conditions were more fortunate. That horizon was never reached. The new government adopts a quite different strategy. The King's speech forecast the maximum amount of action in the field of public enterprise that could have been hoped for by the most radical elements within the party. The new Parliament will have to work harder than any of its predecessors. Moreover, to assist in its task, plans are being made for a speed-up in the procedure of Parliament. When first mooted, this proposal aroused the ire of Mr. Churchill and his followers, who claimed to see in it a proof of his election charges that Labor was intent on tampering with the rights of Parliament and the liberties of the people. This accusation has now been scotched. The Tories for the moment are roaring like sucking doves. And except for a probably unavoidable discontent with the pace of demobilization, the government retains the great fund of good will on domestic policy amassed at the election.

On foreign affairs there are louder murmurs of criticism. Mr. Ernest Bevin, who is probably the most powerful figure in the government, killed all hopes of a sudden reversal in British foreign policy. He won more applause from the Tories than from his own supporters. Continuity of policy was the phrase on everyone's lips. However, the decline in expectation which this speech has caused may prove as unjustified as the earlier excessive jubilation. Toward liberal or left elements in Spain, Italy, and France Mr. Bevin's words were not as warm as they might have been, but a careful examination of them shows that neither General Franco nor the Italian monarchists can derive any encouragement, while in the case of France it appears that a real attempt is to be made to overcome the unhappy misunderstandings of the past few years. In Eastern Europe no one who knew Mr. Bevin could have expected a pro-Communist approach; he is seeking to modify the totalitarian methods employed by the new governments in these countries but, unlike some of his

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Tory predecessors, he is not animated by any anti-Soviet bias. The most serious criticism of Mr. Bevin's attitude concerns Greece. Here he appears to have accepted the same kind of evidence so uncritically welcomed by the coalition government. Proof of continued white terror or preparation for faked elections in Greece would present Mr. Bevin with his first real test as Foreign Secretary; for, as at the time of the fighting, it is clear that the leaders of the Labor Party are not at one with all their followers.

No account of the new government's position would be complete without reference to a fresh and hitherto indefinable factor in the situation. The whole constitution of the Parliamentary Labor Party is revolutionized. Some fifty new members of the party have made their maiden speeches, and the quality they have shown more than confirms Labor's boast at the election that it was the real national party. Of the two hundred new members, most do not yet know one another; they have not had time to master the highly complex business of effective action in Parliament; they have the greatest good will toward the government, but their age is much younger and their accent more virile than many of those whose experience has naturally made them members of the Administration. Their general political outlook is not yet consolidated, but in general they are opposed to the idea of continuity in foreign policy and indeed are healthily impatient about all aspects of policy.

The Tories have too eagerly revealed their desire for a split in labor's ranks. They will not be gratified, but the mood of the new members is certain to have an increasing influence on the government. Meanwhile Britain's recovery from its economic Dunkirk will depend not only on the actions of the government but on the power of these new members to sustain the imagination of the people as they captured it during the election campaign.

China on the Brink

BY T. A. BISSON

[*Mr. Bisson is the author of "Japan in China," "America's Far Eastern Policy," and the forthcoming "Japan's Wartime Economy." He wrote What Program for Japan? in* The Nation *of July 14.*]

THE obvious comment has yet to be made on the Sino-Russian agreements: that the basic Chinese political issue is still with us, and still cries out for settlement. It is a comforting but entirely fallacious thought that since the Chinese Communists have been "let down" by Moscow everyone can sleep easier of nights. Such an interpretation ignores the fact that these "China Reds" have gotten along very well without any Soviet aid for a long time now—since 1927, to be exact, and then the aid was given to a Kuomintang-led popular front. Something in the soil of the good earth has provided them with ample nourishment; they have thrived as a home-grown product. There is a sturdiness to this growth that has shown a capacity to withstand wind and weather. It will have to be reckoned with, in other words. Nor will it be weakened by a Soviet-Chinese understanding which strengthens China's general international position.

Advance reports indicate that Mao Tse-tung is taking nothing new with him to Chungking. He is raising the old, simple demand that the Kuomintang adopt a program of genuinely democratic reform—the only workable solution. We may hope that this time his demand will be accepted. Meanwhile, it will be well for Americans not to fall happily asleep, but to take a long, open-eyed look at the abyss which has yawned in China. Now, especially, it becomes advisable to explore fully some of the darker recesses of Chinese politics into which the light has penetrated but dimly.

If any further demonstration of the desperate need for a settlement of China's internal issues was required, the results of the sudden end of the Pacific war supplied it. Literally over night, Japan's surrender offer of August 10 released the explosive potentialities of the Chinese political situation. The crisis at once pitchforked not only China, but all powers with Far Eastern interests, into an exceedingly awkward predicament. For the immediate future the United States is in the most exposed position. It is essential, above all, that American military personnel do not become involved in Chinese civil strife—an events which would compromise our standing in China and the rest of Asia for decades to come.

In the present unprecedented and swiftly moving situation, a series of extraordinary obstacles stand in the way of adequate judgment on developments in China. The facts reaching the American public are thrice distorted: by Chiang Kai-shek's near monopoly of China's agencies of international publicity, by the strict censorship still maintained on news dispatches from Chungking, and by the unconscious or deliberate bias that characterizes much of our own radio and news commentary. In these circumstances it is particularly necessary to guard against a too ready acceptance of Kuomintang maneuvers in politics and publicity, on the one hand, and a failure to give due weight, on the other, to factors which may provide crucial motivations for the Chinese Communist leaders' reactions and policies.

There was little reason to be surprised by Chiang Kai-shek's initial series of orders: to the Chinese Communists to ground arms, to the Kuomintang troops to continue fighting until the surrender was effected, to the Japanese to give up arms and territory only to Kuomintang commanders. But there was just as little reason to expect that the Communist leaders would tamely submit to a program calculated to bar them from the fruits of a victory to which their arms had contributed so materially. The expressions of shocked surprise over the "flouting" of Chiang's orders by a force that, fighting the Japanese successfully throughout the war with no foreign aid, had yet been blockaded by some 500,000 Kuomintang troops, were uncalled for, to say the least.

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A better knowledge of recent Chinese history might also have led the commentators to qualify their strictures on Mao Tse-tung for his unwillingness to rush off to Chungking for a conference at Chiang Kai-shek's first invitation. In 1929 General Li Chi-shen accepted a similiar invitation to confer on political matters in Nanking under a guaranty of political immunity. When he reached the capital, Chiang Kai-shek blandly settled political issues by arresting him. He was kept under detention for more than a year. In 1931 Hu Han-min, a member of the Kuomintang's leading triumvirate of that period, also proved troublesome, and Chiang incarcerated him "for his own good." A Chinese political leader takes his courage in his hands when he answers the summons to a conference. An opponent of Mao Tse-tung's stature, bitterly hated by the Kuomintang reactionaries, is doubly jeopardized. Fortunately, this conference takes place in the light of world publicity and under the sponsorship of Ambassador Hurley. The American government becomes the guarantor of Mao's safety.

On another point—the use of Chinese puppet, or traitor, troops to reestablish Chiang Kai-shek's control of occupied territory—American commenators have displayed an amazing leniency of judgment. In part this may be attributed to lack of adequate information. During the last three years of the war, foreign correspondents at Chungking were inhibited, less by the censorship than by their own sense of responsibility in the matter of psychological warfare, from exposing to the American public the extensive defections of Kuomintang officers and troops to the Japanese. Today such inhibitions have lost their force, and the full story has become essential to an understanding of some of the basic political factors operating in post-war China.

Military defections by Kuomintang units (there have been none by Chinese Communists) were relatively negligible during the first year of the war. Not only were defections few, but cases of treason were rigorously dealt with. For dereliction of duty the Shantung Governor, General Han Fu-chu, was executed. Following the desertion to the Japanese of the Kuomintang's vice-chief, Wang Ching-wei, in the autumn of 1938, instances of military defection gradually increased. Up to 1940-41, however, Wang Ching-wei's puppet government at Nanking had managed to recruit only a meager armed force, totaling little over 100,000 men. The tide of military defections began to flow strongly in 1942 and reached its flood in 1943-44. Results could be measured in the swelling numbers of Japan's puppet Chinese armies. By 1945, on a conservative estimate, these forces totaled 800,000, of which at least 500,000 were former Kuomintang troops. Included among the commanding officers of the puppet armies was a long list of former Kuomintang generals, such as Pang Ping-hsün, Sun Tien-ying, Chao Yuan-hsiang, Sun Liang-cheng, Chin Yi-wu, Wu Hua-wen, Wang Ching-tsai, Chang Pu-yun, Wang Ching-han, and a host of other officers below the rank of general.

Defections on this scale could not be entirely concealed either from the Chinese populace or from the Chungking foreign correspondents. On occasion embarrassing questions were asked at press conferences. In one notable case, the official Chunking spokesman sought to quiet the correspondents by saying, in effect, that there was no need to be concerned, for the puppet Chinese commanders would turn out to be loyal patriots. This was a rare instance in which news of the puppeteering activity of former Kuomintang military units was cabled abroad, but it may be doubted whether many American readers of the dispatch caught its full implications.

Its meaning was spelled out more definitely on August 10, 1945, the day of Japan's surrender offer, in a special military order of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's broadcast by the Chungking radio "to all Chinese troops and puppet troops in Japanese-occupied areas." Word of this order was evidently not released to the newsmen in Chungking, since no correspondent reported it. In this country, however, it was picked up by the Federal Communications Commission and published on August 11 in the New York *Times*. Its salient points directed "all Chinese puppet troops" to remain in "the present assigned areas," to "preserve peace and order and protect civilians," and to "do their best to redeem themselves."

The celerity with which this order was issued betokens the degree of forethought which had gone into its preparation. It raises a number of interesting questions with regard to the future of the puppet armies, and especially of their commanders. Are the traitor generals, for example, to be permitted "to redeem themselves" and so continue as officers in China's national army? If so, China will be in the enviable position of not having to conduct the sort of trials that have rocked France, Norway, and other European countries. The collaborationists will simply be welcomed back into the Kuomintang fold.

The most significant political angle of this problem, however, still remains to be considered. By a coincidence, virtually all the Kuomintang generals who deserted to the Japanese were operating in north and central China. When their units were reorganized and reequipped by the Japanese what could be more natural than that they should continue to operate in the same areas? As a result, the "assigned areas" noted in Chiang Kai-shek's military order were almost exclusively located in regions contested by the Eighth Route or New Fourth armies, or in the larger cities surrounded by the expanding territories liberated from Japanese control by the bitterly fought campaigns of the Communist forces. By 1945 at least 90 per cent of the 800,000 Chinese puppet troops were so disposed. In some cases the officers of these puppet armies had to deceive their troops to effect the switch to Japanese command. After realizing their situation, numbers of these troops deserted to the Chinese Communists in the course of military operations ordered by their commanding officers.

Little imagination is required to appreciate the reaction of the Chinese Communist leaders to the phenomena here noted. The puppet armies could have appeared in no other light than that of a Kuomintang auxiliary of the Japanese. In order to leave no doubt on this score, Chiang Kai-shek is now proceeding to effect the occupation of Communist-besieged cities, notably in north China but also elsewhere in the country, by reconverting the puppet Chinese divisions in these cities into Kuomintang forces of occupation! In Peiping, for example, the puppet forces have placed themselves under the command of Hu Tsung-nan, blockader of

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the Yenan area and premier anti-Communist field general of the Kuomintang forces. The Japanese commanders are evidently facilitating this turnover, while at the same time refusing to surrender to the Communist armies standing virtually at the city gates. No better tactic for encouraging the outbreak of a major civil war in China could be devised.

In view of the feeble—almost non-existent—Kuomintang military effort north of the Yellow River, it is incredible that Chiang Kai-shek should seem determined to bar the Chinese Communists from receiving the Japanese surrender in this region. Over most of north China, the Eighth Route Army has borne the brunt of the fighting—against Japanese and puppet troops—for the past four years. No regular Kuomintang armies of any size or importance have been fighting the Japanese in this territory. Hu Tsung-nan's large Kuomintang army sat tight and concentrated on its blockade task, while in Shansi and Suiyuan provinces, respectively, the small and ineffective forces of Yen Hsi-shan and Fu Tso-yi have virtually rested on their arms for years. On August 10, however, all three forces sprang to life and are now seeking to occupy strategic centers in Honan, Shansi, and Suiyuan.

But these three Kuomintang armies are all far in the interior. In the key north China provinces of Hopei (Peiping, Tientsin) and Shantung (Tsinan, Tsingtao), regular Kuomintang armies simply do not exist. And the great cities in these provinces are closely encircled by extensive areas liberated by the Eighth Route Army's years of fighting. From these base areas the Communist armies have moved into the outskirts of Peiping, Tientsin, Tsinan, and Tsingtao. Inside the cities are the Japanese and the puppets.

In the final analysis, Chiang Kai-shek must use something better than the puppets to make good his occupation of cities from which regular Kuomintang troops are separated by hundreds of miles. He has one further recourse. He may persuade General Wedemeyer to place American planes at his disposal for the transport of Kuomintang regulars to the north China cities. There is no certainty that the Eighth Route Army will permit such a move to pass unchallenged, as was demonstrated by its occupation of the Nanyuan airfield outside Peiping. If fighting develops, it is quite likely that American personnel will find themselves in the line of fire. An incident would provide fuel for a "Red scare" in some American newspapers, but the responsibility would rest squarely on General Wedemeyer. American planes and pilots were sent to China for use in the war against Japan, not to become a pawn in China's internal politics.

Battle of the St. Lawrence

BY BENJAMIN J. ATLAS

[*Mr. Atlas is Washington correspondent of the Syracuse, New York,* Herald-Journal. *He was formerly chief of the special information section of the Army Specialized Training Division, War Department.*]

CONGRESS will soon resume its perennial debate on whether the St. Lawrence waterway should be harnessed for cheap electric power and opened to deep-draft navigation. Far to the north of where the familiar arguments will be heard the St. Lawrence spills its way to the Atlantic in the manner of some Gulliver proving his strength while the Lilliputians still conjecture his worth. Along the 2,687-mile Great Lakes-St. Lawrence artery from the heart of North America to the open sea, shallow-draft ships carry our commerce. Through the narrow length of river between Canada and New York State race all the waters of the Great Lakes, with the power of more than 2,000,000 horses thirteen billion kilowatts of electric energy.

The proposal to harness this energy and to open the entire waterway to deep-draft oceangoing vessels has been before Congress for almost half a century. Meanwhile, engineers of the United States and Canada have completed exhaustive surveys showing that for $421,000,000 the last remaining obstructions to deep-draft navigation could be removed and a power plant built to give the people of the Northeast a hydroelectric development far bigger than the TVA. In annual output of electricity, which would be shared equally by the United States and Canada, the project would be the biggest in the world.

In refusing to authorize the development Congress has exhibited as much scorn for the counsel of governmental and industrial leaders as for the laws of nature and technology. Down through the years the project has been advocated by such diverse men as Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Alfred E. Smith, Calvin Coolidge, Owen D. Young, and Henry I. Harriman. Experts have advised Congress that the completed project would open the hinterland of North America to practically 90 per cent of the world's ocean shipping and supply an urgent need for low-cost electricity in an area inhabited by one-fifth of the continent's population. In the most thorough survey of its kind the United States Department of Commerce showed that shipping costs and electric rates would be reduced, railroad and water commerce increased, and industry, agriculture, and employment stimulated.

The Aluminum Company of America with professional adroitness has encouraged opposition to public development of the St. Lawrence, whose resources it covets for itself. After World War I it nearly succeeded in preempting them. Uniting with General Electric and du Pont under the name of the Frontier Corporation, Alcoa sought exclusive rights to the St. Lawrence and some neighboring waters for a 5,000,000-horse-power project on which the corporation was willing to spend $1,300,000,000. Fortunately the late Governor Smith of New York thwarted the attempted grab. Smith

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insisted that the resources belonged to and should be used for the benefit of all the people. Apparently "all the people" still lack a majority in Congress on the St. Lawrence issue.

Two St. Lawrence bills were dropped into the House hopper before the recess. Forensics will start in the Senate after a bill is offered by Senator George D. Aiken (Republican, Vermont), whose loyalty to the St. Lawrence waterway is reminiscent of the late Senator George Norris's crusade for the TVA. Aiken will repeat a proposal he made in vain to the Seventy-eighth Congress for approval of a 1941 agreement between the United States and Canada to complete the project. The 1941 agreement incorporated many features of a treaty signed by the United States and Canada during Hoover's Administration but later denied Senate ratification. The TVA is a federal agency, but the United States' share of the St. Lawrence power would be controlled by New York State, presumably through its Power Authority, first chartered by the state when Roosevelt was governor. From returns on the power sales New York offers to pay to the federal government over a fifty-year period an amount estimated in 1941 at $93,375,000.

The most ominous threat to the public-power scheme is now found in the willingness of many anti-St. Lawrence Congressmen to support a new Aiken proposal on condition that transmission of the power be restricted to the utilities companies. The gravity of that threat is increased by the silence of the present New York State administration on a St. Lawrence power-marketing policy. Roosevelt and Lehman as governors of New York never left any doubt that the State Power Authority would be authorized to build its own transmission lines whenever necessary to encourage increased distribution of St. Lawrence power at the lowest possible rates. Governor Thomas E. Dewey, however, has not yet given a clear-cut definition of his power-marketing policy, although he is backing the St. Lawrence development. Vice Chairman Leland Olds of the Federal Power Commission challenged Dewey not long ago to clarify his position. "Governor Dewey has reiterated his support for the project," said Olds, "but does he mean a 'Muscle Shoals' in the days when its power was sold to the Alabama Power Company for two mills while residential customers paid the company eight cents and farms could not afford power? Or does he mean a 'Muscle Shoals' serving as a stimulus to real American enterprise, as a means to higher and more stable living standards, as Senator George Norris conceived it?"

Dewey's response may well determine the fate of the St. Lawrence issue. It will have a decided influence on the trend of utility rates in the American sector of the area to be served by the proposed St. Lawrence plant—an area with a radius of three hundred miles. Electric rates imposed upon consumers in this area, particularly in New York State, have long been criticized as stratospheric. Olds recently pointed out that the monthly electric bill paid by New York City householders for 100 kilowatt-hours would buy 250 kilowatt-hours in Cincinnati, Madison, Topeka, Spokane, and Washington, D. C., in every case from a tax-paying private company. Experience in power marketing, whether at the municipal, state, or federal level, has proved that the most effective way to cut rates is to apply a government yardstick. Senator Lister Hill of Alabama, whose constituents are among the millions blessed by the TVA, has likened the government transmission line to "a public highway that brings the benefits of multiple-purpose projects to farmers, to householders, and to business men alike. If the government is required to sell merely to one large utility in the vicinity that can afford to build a line to the government's power dam," Hill has warned the Senate, "that utility will be able to dictate the terms upon which the power may be sold by the government."

Obviously passage of a St. Lawrence bill under conditions preventing any but private transmission would be a hollow victory for the people. Amid the growing pressures to cripple the project, a reaffirmation of the marketing policy enunciated by Roosevelt and Lehman is an urgent responsibility of the present New York State administration. As a matter of legislative procedure, details of a marketing program could await a federal-state contract subsequent to Congressional approval of the United States-Canada agreement. Nevertheless, an unequivocal expression of policy is needed now to head off the latest move to hamstring the public project. That the danger of a disastrous compromise is real is not doubted by anyone close to the Washington scene. In the debate that preceded the Senate's defeat of the Aiken proposal last winter by a two-to-one vote, Aiken exposed the offers of some private-utility operators to withdraw opposition "if they could be sure the St. Lawrence power would not be used for expansion of public power lines."

It is certain that Dewey, if he wished it, could get President Truman's backing for a policy of public transmission. Truman voted for Aiken's St. Lawrence proposal last December while he was a member of the Senate. He has demonstrated his allegiance to public power several times since, as for instance by renaming David E. Lilienthal as TVA chairman.

Dewey would be well advised politically to make the state's power-marketing policy clear at once. The challenge for a showdown is certain to grow as the time approaches for his reelection drive in 1946, preparatory to another possible try for the Presidency. Dewey's general declaration for the St. Lawrence last January drew the wrath of Republicans, but they will give him their votes out of party loyalty. Meanwhile, on the strength of that utterance, the Republican Governor has gained credit among Roosevelt liberals. He can ill afford to weaken his popularity with that group by ignoring the power-marketing issue.

Dewey's general friendliness to the St. Lawrence development up to now has become particularly embarrassing to United States Senator James M. Mead. Mead's explanation that he would support the power project divorced from the seaway cannot erase his recorded vote against the St. Lawrence proposal last December. He will have to live down that act in 1946 when he attempts either to stay in the United States Senate or to wrest the Governorship from Dewey.

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Many of Mead's liberal supporters are still hopeful that he will come out convincingly for the St. Lawrence project as a whole. They would like to see the Buffalo Democrat end his preoccupation with the local interests of his home city, where grain-storage operators are worried about the seaway's possible threat to their profits. Mead's stand on the St. Lawrence issue has been turned to effective advantage by the anti-public power bloc.

While Congress has regaled itself with diverting dialectics on the St. Lawrence, Alcoa's sister company in Canada (Aluminium, Ltd.) has created its own private power empire at a strategic corner of the St. Lawrence system, with American taxpayers sharing the financial risks. Supported by a $200,000,000 loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, including an advance of $68,500,000, the Aluminium, Ltd., plant at Shipshaw on the Saguenay River north of Quebec has developed a capacity to generate 1,200,000 horse-power for its own benefit. The mistrust with which the United States Department of Justice regards Alcoa and Aluminium, Ltd., is apparently understood in Canada, and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation has been waging a vigorous campaign to reclaim the resources for the people. The Quebec parliament last spring authorized purchase of private power plants on the St. Lawrence with a view to public control, and the Quebec government has already taken over the Montreal Light, Heat, and Power Company. Some persons have suggested the advisability of integrating the Shipshaw development with the rest of the St. Lawrence-Niagara system in an international super-TVA for the Northeast. The suggestion is of importance as pointing up the potentialities of the world's cheapest source of hydroelectric power.

What is needed to rescue the St. Lawrence resources for the public is immediate grass-roots action. The true case for the St. Lawrence has not yet reached the rank-and-file business men, farmers, and householders who would reap the project's benefits. The anti-St. Lawrence propaganda to which these people have been systematically exposed year after year has killed their interest in the question. Yet only the insistence of the folks back home will get action from Congress. Even Senator Robert F. Wagner, long a public-power advocate, waited until this year before consenting to be among the sponsors of Aiken's St. Lawrence legislation. Only a resurgence of public interest can put an end to the sham of such distractions as whether the St. Lawrence project ought to be voted on again as a treaty needing ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. It would take strong popular pressure to compel the New York State administration to declare itself for something more than just a title to a power site.

Once business men have been introduced to the truth about public power, they have been quick to appreciate its value as an industrial catalyst and a rate-cutting influence. The most vigorous champions of the TVA today are the storekeepers, factory owners, and farmers in the area who had mistrusted public power before the TVA became a reality. Their vigorous disapproval of Senator Kenneth McKellar's attempt to hamstring the Lilienthal administration offers a model for action in the Northeast. The battle for the St. Lawrence must be won without much more delay lest most of the benefits be denied to the people forever.

In the Wind

DEBATE: The Chicago *Sun* of August 26 carried the following advertisement: "Town Club weekly public forum. . . . Today at 3 p.m. 'What Should We Do with a Defeated Japan?' Speakers: 'Yes!' Irving Pflaum, foreign editor, Chicago *Times*. 'No!' George Kao, Chinese News Service."

PROBLEM: An Associated Press dispatch from Madrid on August 23 reported, "A committee of directors of leading Spanish newspapers and magazines will be named next month to find a formula easing the present complete internal censorship without exposing the Franco regime to attacks by the opposition."

TROPE: "The European enemies are vanquished," says an advertisement in the August 12 issue of the *Sunday Guardian*, Port of Spain, Trinidad, "and Gibraltar is intact, impregnable, and redoubtable as ever. This rock has stood the test of time. In Trinidad we have built this Gibraltar of the Cleaning and Dyeing Industry. It took us over sixty years to build this unshakable rock. It has also stood the test of time and tribulation and today it stands as firm as ever under its present generals R. J. J. Clamens and Roy Clamens. All loyal subjects can depend on the excellence of our service at Gibraltar."

LABOR: The Metropolitan Music School, New York, has signed a contract with the Music Teachers Chapter of the Teachers Union, Local 555, C. I. O. This is the first music school in the country to have a union contract.

OBSESSION: John O'Donnell of the New York *Daily News* is still fighting Franklin D. Roosevelt. In his column of August 30, on the Pearl Harbor report, he called the late President "No. 1 public enemy of the United States in that horrible and shocking disaster."

PHILOSOPHY: "Is it a bad habit to reflect much upon the meaning of life?" asked Dr. Albert Edward Wiggam in his column, Explore Your Mind, in newspapers of August 24. "Worse than bad," he answered, "it's dangerous, unless you enjoy a nervous breakdown."

AD HOMINEM: Dr. John P. Peters, professor of medicine at Yale, spoke for the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill in a debate on health insurance over Station WOR August 28. Dr. Morris Fishbein, editor of the *Journal of the American Medical Association,* answered his arguments by asserting that Dr. Peters was not a practicing physician. But even less is Dr. Fishbein. He has worked for the American Medical Association ever since he completed his interneship. And Dr. Peters *is* on the staffs of the New Haven Hospital and the New Haven Dispensary.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. We will pay $1 for each item accepted.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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The New Spanish Cabinet

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Mexico City, August 29

THE Spanish republican crisis in Mexico was resolved several days ago, and the confusion that the first news about it must have created among American readers can now be somewhat cleared up. Naturally every Spanish republican, whether or not he occupies an official post, feels an intense obligation not to say anything that might prejudice the common cause. There are, however, two or three aspects of the situation which, perplexing as they may appear when viewed from a distance, are perfectly clear to those who played a role in the recent crisis.

The first is the question, now being widely debated by Dr. Negrín's followers, of why he risked a procedure that could end, as it did, by removing him from the leadership of the government. It is indeed true that when Dr. Negrín arrived in Mexico the great mass of the emigration, there and elsewhere, supported him. Why, his friends are asking one another, did he run the risk of calling in the parliamentary groups when, in the opinion of the ordinary citizen, many of the deputies, elected in 1936 before the Franco rebellion, do not represent the militant feelings of the Spanish people today? The answer was clearly stated in my article, Negrín's Plan for Spain, published in *The Nation* of July 21. Without the intervention of the Cortes there was no constitutional procedure for filling the vacant Presidency of the Republic, and without a President, Negrín could not, in accordance with the Constitution, broaden or reorganize his Cabinet. But, above all, Negrín was preoccupied with the consideration that recognition might be withheld by certain countries unless an enlarged and fully representative constitutional government were created. Only those who do not know Dr. Negrín can possibly imagine that he failed to take into account those dangerous maneuvers whose sole objective was to destroy him and his policy of resistance. At the first Cabinet meeting after his arrival here each of his ministers resident in Mexico called Negrín's attention to the danger of his being victimized by some such maneuver.

Dr. Negrín's answer was that he had no choice and that he must trust that a sense of responsibility and duty toward the Spanish people would ultimately prevail. Some of Dr. Negrín's friends suggested, not for his sake, but for the sake of the cause, that there should be a prior pact by which Negrín would facilitate the legal procedures necessary for a reorganization of the government, with the clear understanding that he should be retained as Prime Minister. Negrín is not the man for deals of this sort.

The second point that is being passionately discussed in Mexico is why Negrín did not accept a post in the Giral Cabinet. Here a brief chronology of the crisis is in order. President Martinez Barrio assumed his post on Friday, August 17, and finished his consultations with the heads of the various parties on Wednesday, August 22. During these five days intrigues were increasing; on Tuesday night, however, the general impression in Mexico was that President Barrio would call upon Negrín. On Wednesday morning we were informed that the President had asked Giral to form a government.

Giral requested an interview with Negrín and in this first conversation offered him the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Negrín left the decision to the executive committee of the Socialist Party to which he belongs. The executive committee communicated with Giral and told him that circumstances made it advisable that Negrín should continue as Prime Minister and that they would not authorize him to hold a Cabinet post. However, if the Cabinet were a broad republican coalition the executive committee would be ready to provide another minister as a gesture of support and cooperation. In the next forty-eight hours various propositions were made to Negrín: that he should be Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs; that he should be Vice-President with an additional portfolio and that I should continue as Foreign Minister; that he should be Vice-President and Foreign Minister and that two of his friends, outstanding physicians, but without special political significance, should be included in the Cabinet. Negrín invariably replied that it was not a question of posts but of policy.

In order to face the arduous and complicated task of restoring the Republic, the Prime Minister must be in a position to direct policy in all its aspects. International and national policies could not be separated. Nor could the support of various nations be enlisted without guaranties of a national policy that would permit reestablishment of the Republic without unnecessary violence. Therefore the first requisite was to have true representation of all political forces within the government, and to leave the doors open to any group that chose to exclude itself. And secondly, the government needed a homogeneous policy and bold, strong direction.

On Saturday José Antonio de Aguirre, President of the autonomous Basque government, arrived and held a conference with Giral and myself. This was our last effort to achieve a broad coalition and to prevent the formation of a government in which the representation of the various republican forces was more apparent than real. Twelve hours later Giral abruptly declared the negotiations at an end, insisted on being Prime Minister, and presented the original list of Cabinet members that he had held in readiness since Friday.

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The third point that must be clarified is the insinuation that only "Negrín and the Communists" remained outside the government. This was an unfortunate note for the new Prime Minister to strike in explaining the reason for the crisis; his statement evoked a sharp reply from the groups that had refused to join the Cabinet. These groups include the Socialist Party whose executive committee was elected in Spain (as distinct from the other branch of the party organized in exile by Indalecio Prieto); the U. G. T., the strongest trade-union organization in Spain; an important segment of the Left Republicans, the party founded by the late President Azaña; the Federal Party; the Basque Nationalist Action; the Asturian Workers Alliance, and others. They asserted their joint responsibility for the decision to remain outside the government and rebuked Giral for adopting the tactics used by the enemies of the Republic throughout the Spanish war. They explained that the reason for their decision was their united belief that "only a strong policy of resistance" such as was maintained by the last republican government could secure the establishment of a democratic regime in Spain. They pointed out that the Prime Minister is chiefly responsible for defining and representing the policy of the Cabinet. "Dr. Negrín's political significance would have been neutralized had his name appeared side by side with those of the persons now in the Cabinet—very honorable men but some of them representing a policy utterly different from and even contrary to what we believe indispensable at this moment." Whereas the government itself would have been weakened by the presence within it of such strongly conflicting points of view, the reply ended with the declaration that the abstaining group, "as republicans and democrats," will applaud the success of the new Cabinet, if success is obtained.

At 7:30 on Sunday evening Giral's Cabinet was announced. At 8:30 Negrín was already working on a plan of action with representatives of the parties and groups mentioned above. He easily exchanged the title of chief of the government for that of chief of the resistance. Nor was it any more difficult for me to surrender the post of Foreign Minister for freedom to devote myself fully to my work as an editor of *The Nation*. At such moments one realizes how little importance there is in a ministerial title if it is not accompanied by intense and useful action. Only time will tell if, from the point of view of the republican cause, the shift from one administration to another will prove equally rewarding and without penalties. We say: "As republicans, whether the government pleases us or not, we are pleased that a government has resulted from the present crisis; we must not attack it or make its life more difficult." That is what Negrín will say at the first public function since the crisis, which will be held on September 3 at the Fronton. He will urge full support of the government on the part of all republican elements. Nor is his attitude merely theoretical: to republican army officers and civil servants in Mexico who remain loyal to him he has said, "You belong to Spain and you must put yourselves at the disposal of the government." At the same time he will appeal to the friends of Spain everywhere not to be discouraged or pessimistic but to maintain intact their enthusiasm and fighting spirit on behalf of the Spanish people.

Yugoslav Democracy, Limited

BY HAL LEHRMAN

Belgrade, August 31 (By cable)

DISGRUNTLED bourgeois sip their spritzer in the Ruski Tsar, the cafe of the Belgrade élite on Prince Michael's Street, and trade sneers regarding the newly mighty who now inhabit Dedinje Hill. The partisans have taken over the villas of the aristocracy, and it is a source of bitter mirth to today's "underprivileged" that one high official who lived in jails or cellars hiding from the police most of his adult life now resides in two mansions with twenty domestics. But the partisan chiefs are working hard and long hours in the midst of their opulence, and there are weightier reasons for complaint about contemporary Yugoslavia.

I did not believe the stories which assailed me on my arrival here about the persecution of Yugoslavs who do not regard Britons and Americans as enemies of the nation—until the proof exploded under my nose. The August 1 celebration of United States Army Air Force Day proclaimed by Truman was organized by a group of Belgrade youth. The auditorium was draped with Yugoslav and American flags, the Air Force film "Memphis Belle" was shown, and two young men delivered pro-American speeches passed by the Yugoslav censor. At 2 a. m. the next day both were arrested by the OZNA and held incommunicado.

For forty-eight hours I tried vainly to see the police authorities, or the prisoners, or at least learn the charges. On the third day I was officially informed that the youths had been arrested because, according to "numerous previous reports," they had been associated with the Chetniks. I inquired why nothing had been done about the alleged reports until the morning after the pro-American demonstrations. No reply—except that the prisoners were suddenly released.

Top-ranking partisans say privately that the masses have disliked the Allies ever since the days of the occupation, when, after combat against combined German-Chetnik raiders, or after seeing their villages burned down by Chetniks, they gathered around the radio and heard London extol the heroic resistance of the Chetniks against the invaders. Nor has the record of the Allied occupation of Trieste and other Yugoslav irredenta endeared us to them. For whatever reasons official organs like the police and press are systematically anti-Allied.

Annoyances go fairly high. The British wasted weeks trying to get authorization to fly courier planes between their

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consulates and were finally forced to appeal directly to Tito. The Anglo-Yank embassies have several times formally protested against discrimination. The Soviet embassy hasn't found démarches necessary.

Belgrade rumbles with rumors of terror in the provinces. I am told there are three methods for disposing of suspects: mobilization and shipment to remote areas whence no letters return; arrest by the OZNA and disappearance; kidnapping or murder by unidentified "bandits" with whom the police somehow never catch up. I cannot confirm or deny these reports—because I have been unable to go and see. Correspondents need passes for travel more than a few miles outside of Belgrade, and only Soviet correspondents are able to get them.

I shall pass over the atmosphere of fear here in the capital, the unwarranted searches of homes and the seizure of property, the deep and abiding hatred against the regime on the part of many plain citizens who did not go to the hills during the occupation but did not collaborate with Mihailovich, Nedich, or the Germans either. Let's examine the program for the future, a few of the eleven monumental laws which the Parliament has passed in the last seven days.

My last dispatch called the legislation constructive and I still think so. The menace lies in the ambiguity of the escape clauses at the service of doctrinaire administrators. Take the law on the right to vote. Article Four disfranchises leading members of war-time fascist organizations, but "also any individuals who associated themselves with such work." "People's committees" are empowered to draw up voting lists. Thirteen deputies, including the Croat moderate and former minister Subasich, have already filed protests with Parliament concerning the manner in which these committees are operating in Zagreb. In Belgrade last week a ward committee moved to strike a man from the register because he sold an overcoat on the black market in order to get food. Conversely a woman who had stolen a kilo of sugar was reinstated on the register because her daughter, aged fifteen, had tattled against schoolmates for scribbling anti-Tito slogans on walls. None of these decisions is final, pending confirmation of a higher committee, but the tendency is obvious.

Article One of the law on the press guarantees its liberty, but eighteen other articles proceed to restrict it. Article Six excludes anyone ever connected with fascist and pro-fascist writings. Article Eleven authorizes suspension for "spreading false and alarming rumors endangering the state." Also noteworthy are the government controls over paper distribution and almost all printing plants. There are more than a hundred pro-government journals in Yugoslavia and not a single one for the opposition.

One could go on taking apart all the other laws. The guaranty of right of association prohibits political parties which are fascist or spread discord, but does not give any definitions. The law on the election of deputies allows parties outside the all-powerful People's Front to enter national tickets but does not provide the freedom of travel necessary for building a national organization. And the law on crimes against the state, by incriminating anyone threatening the "people's authority," gives the government carte blanche for the persecution of all critics.

This indictment verging on diatribe is not intended to impugn the greatness of the partisan struggle or the merits of the leaders, some of whom are of giant stature. As Kosanovitch said in the Parliament, explaining why his Independent Democratic Party is in the People's Front, "If there had been no Front and if the procrastination advocated by reaction had prevailed, we would be faced with unsolved Serb-Croat, Serb-Bulgar, and Macedonian problems and would be entering into civil war." The partisans revived and solidified the concept of a federative Yugoslavia. The ways, and factories, and increasing of production, relief for Balkan brotherhood. They have a vigorous program of internal reconstruction: land reform, building of roads, railways, and factories, and increasing of production, relief for devastated areas, and aid to the sick, the hungry, and the old. They are young and burning with enthusiasm for "people's democracy of the masses." And that's why they have no moderation and no charity for honestly critical opinion. The "people" are a closed corporation and membership therein is arbitrarily barred to too many.

I do not credit the accusations of many dubious patriots now crowding the correspondents' doors here (and speaking excellent French or German) that the Communists are greedy to retain and expand their personal power. True, they have the power. Other parties have many posts and the semblance of power, but the Communists possess it in reality because they hold the key positions. Subasich may be the Foreign Minister, but a Communist is the chief of his political department, and a Communist is director of personnel. Of the "Big Five" in a Cabinet of twenty-six, Tito, Kardelj, and Pijade are avowed Communists; Hebrang and Rakovich—the latter is chief of the OZNA—do not wear labels but aren't fooling anybody. During the occupation 25,000 Communists died, including eleven of the Central Committeemen, and also 50,000 from the Federation of Communist Youth. The party has too big a stake to leave much room for tolerance.

The opposition—minuscule in the Parliament but potentially weighty in the country—dreads the worst. A Democratic Party spokesman, Savko Dukanac, put it neatly: "The chief trouble with . . . your laws is that there is no confidence between us. You do not believe in our well-intentioned criticism, and we do not believe your people's authority will administer the laws impartially."

One measure of hope lies in the regime's sensitivity to foreign opinion. Even the small publicity given abroad to Dr. Milan Grol's resignation from the Vice-Premiership brought fervid denials of "totalitarianism" and hasty recognition of the opposition's right to speak its mind in the Parliament. Where previously the government, through Pijade, had threatened that "the people would go to war" against a future constituent assembly if it tampered with the prescriptions set down in advance for the constitution, the government now, through Kardelj, assures the country that the assembly may write any constitution it pleases. The bugaboo of the partisans is Allied intervention. They look across the frontiers toward Greece and Bulgaria and Rumania and shut their eyes defiantly to the spectacle of supervisory election commissions. They'll concede much to be spared further mention of this distressing subject.

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

THE FACE IN THE MOUNTAIN

BY JAMES GROSSMAN

THERE are certain resemblances that once seen cannot be driven from the mind. If, when you are looking at some rock formation on a mountain, it takes on the appearance of a human face, there is nothing to do but resign yourself to tracing its details. The unsought image once having come will not go away, and the more you reason with it the more persistent it will be. The only relief is to give yourself to it thoroughly and tell others about it, which is what summer visitors among the mountains always do.

There is at least a fascination, if of a low order, in finding faces in mountains; and the reverse, discovering natural scenery in faces—as crags in brows, pools in eyes—remains after centuries a standard practice of literature. The utter dissimilarity of the things compared excuses the attempt; it is at the worst likely to fall flat for having been done so often before. But where a superficial similarity exists, the attempt at further comparison is always dangerous. If one finds two faces alike or two authors, they had better be like with a vengeance; for because they already have in common the same number of features or the writing of books in the same language, there will be a peculiar irritation in the slightest failure of the claimed resemblance.

My own particular obsession of a haunting likeness came over me recently while I was reading again some of the stories of Henry James about writers and artists; I was reminded at almost every turn—although I was sure at the same time that it was some mere common humanity that was taking me in—of the plays of George Kaufman. Through all the bitterness of "The Death of the Lion" there came to me constant and unwelcome recollections—unwelcome, I mean, for the moment and for their seeming inappropriateness—of all of the gaiety of "The Butter and Egg Man" and "Once in a Lifetime."

One cannot argue with memory; it comes as it will or it will not come at all. My own argument was completely unsuccessful: next to Henry James I could think of no American who had written as much as George Kaufman—to include for convenience in his own name those of his various collaborators—about the arts and the life of the artist. There were the actor in "The Royal Family" and "Stage Door," the play producer in "The Butter and Egg Man," the movie director—the movies themselves in fact—in "Once in a Lifetime," the song writer in "June Moon," and the playwright in "Merrily We Roll Along." Nor would it do to say that these were practicers of the inferior arts, which as subjects are not quite the same as "art" itself. James had answered this very objection in his preface to "The Tragic Muse": "The late R. L. Stevenson was to write me . . . on the occasion of 'The Tragic Muse' that he was at a loss to conceive how one could find an interest in anything so vulgar or pretend to gather fruit in so scrubby an orchard; but the view of a creature of the stage, the view of the 'histrionic temperament,' as suggestive much less, verily, in respect to the poor stage *per se* than in respect to 'art' at large, affected me in spite of that as justly tenable."

Nothing could be scrubbier or more vulgar than Tin Pan Alley or shoestring producers or, for all its gaudiness, Hollywood, as Kaufman shows them; unless it be "all the stupidity and vulgarity and hypocrisy" of the conditions of the practice of literature in James's London of the 1890's. In this London world as shown in, say, "The Death of the Lion" are the female author with a man's name ("convenient, you know, for a lady who goes in for the larger latitude, . . . men are more naturally indelicate"); the male author with a woman's name ("because the ladies are such popular favorites"); the recording instruments of literary fame—one's portrait painted by the latest fashionable painter and one's "home life" described in the syndicated gossip column, "Smatter and Chatter," along with the latest divorcée; and, above all, the great social menagerie into which the captured Lion is brought by the proprietress and her noble friends, who do everything for him, including losing his manuscript and abandoning him to die alone, but who never, in all their admiration, read ten pages he ever wrote.

So many of the details of this story have their obvious counterpart in Kaufman's plays that one is tempted to press hard on those which do not at first glance seem to fit into his work. Even the death, and the manuscript so carelessly handed about unread from one admirer to another until it is lost by the servants, yield something very like under the gentlest pressure. For these symbols of an indifference to literature amounting to contempt and hatred we have in "Once in a Lifetime" the playwright Lawrence Vail, bafflingly and mystifyingly lost and the object of wide public search while he sits every day in the very center of the great studio, under the eyes of the efficient secretary, waiting to speak to someone about what his work is to be. The figurative references to cages and keepers and to the trapped and caught state of the Lion have become literal, if only off-stage, facts in the case of Lawrence Vail. Playwrights' rooms in Hollywood are locked ("Once they get out of their rooms nobody knows what becomes of them") and no one willingly goes there, "those padded walls and the bars over the windows" are so scaring. Vail does not die; instead, he has a breakdown and is cured in a sanitarium conducted solely for playwrights who have gone to Hollywood, by a playwright who was once there.

In Kaufman as much as in James the really good artist is

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acted upon by his environment but does not successfully act on it. If he has an effect on his environment it is an unintended one. Lawrence Vail's outburst to George Lewis against the fantastic waste of Hollywood is repeated to the great Glogauer by George in sufficiently garbled form to start his career of prodigality, magnificent mistakes, and boundless success. By much the same irony—but on a much more modest scale of conduct, for nothing can compete with Hollywood for lavishness of wasted effort—Hugh Vereker brings about the opposite of what he intends; his explanation to the narrator of "The Figure in the Carpet" that there is a central meaning in all his work sets the narrator off on an endless wild-goose chase to discover the secret by every means except the one of actually reading the work with attention and imagination.

The difference in stature between Lawrence Vail on the one hand and the Lion, Hugh Vereker, or Ralph Limbert on the other is necessary because of the difference in the point of view from which the two authors regard their central common fact, the public taste, which both with equal cynicism place at the same low level. James's major interest is in the greatness that fails with the public; Kaufman's is in the simple-mindedness that is essential for the greatest popular success. To show by how much one can miss on the high side and to measure the flatness of the scene around him by its imagined opposite, James has created in his novelists a whole school of literary giants, sensitive, perceptive, ironic, doomed. They tower if anything too much, and we search uselessly for their likeness in James himself, as if only fact and not the imagination could be the source of true greatness. The intelligent Lawrence Vail is made to tower over the world around him just enough to show how little talent is too much for it to take to itself and use. He cannot from his relatively easy heights—any more than could Ralph Limbert from his greater one in "The Next Time"—stoop low enough to come to the great popular level. In James's words, "It takes more than trying—it comes by grace."

The true grace, it seems to me, is in never having had to stoop, in having been there all along out of sheer innocence of any higher places. The successful ones all have it: the lyric writer who can rhyme "June" and "moon" in perfect good faith, without the slightest suspicion that it has ever been done before; the young butter and egg man from Chillicothe who cannot say "brothel" without blushing, but who produces so good a brothel scene in his play that the police will raid it; James's Greville Fane, the clergyman's spotless widow who writes of the fierce immoral passions of duchesses while she watches over her children in their cribs and pats their heads; and above all, George Lewis. All these have the lovable innocence of paradise, which is worth good hard cash in a world that has eaten the fruit of the tree.

George is the most perfect of them all. We are told of Greville Fane that she "couldn't write a page of English," but we are forever being surprised to find that George can read one. He is completely free of any complications of mind or even of rhetoric—he does not know that words can mean the opposite of what they say or in fact that they can be used figuratively—and has no entanglements of any kind with the world of ideas. He goes unswervingly through the production of the movie, like some intellectual Sir Galahad who, because he is unaware of their very existence, cannot be seduced by those twin enchantresses, art and reality.

The gift of being untouched by life cannot be found, but it can be lost in the course of living. We are certain that the ingenuous young man from Chillicothe will never be successful after his first production, because he thinks he knows now how it is done; and we are happy when he goes back to the hotel business. The musically illiterate composer in "June Moon" is slipping because he has become too self-conscious of the value of his ignorance, too aware that "it ruins a composer to play the piano too good"; only an infusion of naiveté—and his new lyric writer, the hero, has enough for two—saves him. Greville Fane can no longer write successfully about the glamour of a vicious aristocracy when she sees that she has created in her children two vicious aristocrats.

George's enduring incorruptibility represents, I suspect, an ideal rather than any merely likely state of facts. In our own experience there is often so great a disparity between the artist and his work that we can account for it, as James has pointed out in the fable of "The Private Life," only by the notion that the artist at his work is a different person from the one we meet. It is one of the most consoling functions of art to deny this common fact and to picture the ideal artist, in perfect and lasting correspondence to his work. Of course when the artist is portrayed as being exactly like his work, then we can see his work in him without having it exhibited to us at length. This is one of the reasons for the peculiar convincingness of James's dying novelists and of Kaufman's George. (It is a minor but probably unavoidable blemish in "June Moon" that we hear the song of that name; we can imagine, in fact we have heard, worse.)

The public as an abstraction has always been a faceless, nameless thing that consumes and destroys. Its individual members share the function but have none of the terrifying aspect of the monster; they have rather the naive simple-mindedness of the popular artist himself. As he creates, so they destroy, with the innocence and good faith of children. "The conscience of these people," the narrator observes of Lady Augusta and her friends, who have lost the Lion's manuscript, "is like a summer sea." Lady Augusta asks whether, if the manuscript shouldn't reappear for the occasion of its reading to the Princess, "the author wouldn't have something else to read that would do just as well."

Standing as she does for the public, she is in this question at one with the perfect popular artist, George Lewis. It is fitting that the mere notion of discrimination—there is surely some significance in the fact that the word has practically only a pejorative meaning now—should be alien to her, for it is to him. His very method of work is that of pure chance: by reaching into his wastebasket instead of his files for a scenario he makes the wrong movie.

Lady Augusta has a slightly more sophisticated sister in the telephone operator of "The Butter and Egg Man," who is at least aware of the great question of discrimination. When the tryout has gone miserably in Syracuse, the wise Broadway producers call on her, as on the public in human form, for "some good straight dope, a fresh viewpoint" on what's wrong with their play. She says, "Well, I'll tell you. . . .

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Syracuse is a funny town. . . . You see, the people here are funny, sort of. If they *like* a show they'll *go* to it, but if they don't like it—they *won't*." I wonder, but it would take us beyond our present subject, if the most elaborate apparatus of statistical science for questioning the public on what it wants of the lively arts can do more than multiply her answer.

I have spoken only of successful works of James and Kaufman. They also have some resemblances in two unsatisfactory pieces, "The Lesson of the Master" and "Merrily We Roll Along." Both deal with the successful abuse of talents by the writer who is ashamed of his popular success because he "knows" he should have done better. Each has lacked the strength to resist the good things of the world, particularly a wife. Richard Niles's first wife nags him into worse; the Master's burns his best. The Master's fate is the less bitter of the two; his first wife is quite chic, and on her death he marries the charming girl whom his young admirer has given up on his advice. Niles's fate is sheer horror: his wives turn into hags at his touch.

Both works treat solemnly and with a heavy irony what appears to be the richest material in comedy. James and Kaufman in their separate ways have often snatched their brightest comic triumphs from situations that seen as we usually see them in life are ugly and drab: the publisher in "June Moon" who in order to sell his mistress buys the song; in "The Next Time" the hopeless struggle of Ralph Limbert to stifle his intelligence and good taste so that he may write something that will sell and keep his family from starving; in "The Tree of Knowledge" the lives that have been warped to form a protective circle around the fatuous sculptor and hide from him the total silliness of his work. It is odd that they should see the difficult so clearly and miss the obvious so completely.

The material of "Merrily We Roll Along" and "The Lesson of the Master" calls particularly for comic treatment. The tragic dilemma of Niles and the Master is our own and unbearably close. The awareness that we were meant for better things is so much the smug secret knowledge of each of us that for fear of self-betrayal we cannot publicly give ourselves to it with sympathy, unless at the same time we are allowed to laugh. Clean laughter denied, we make our own Philistine jokes. We snicker at the torture that comes from wearing a hair shirt made of the most expensive silk. We deny the high price of public favor and insist that the two characters come by it as cheaply as the divinely sponging Saltram in "The Coxon Fund" "accepts favors, loans, sacrifices—all with nothing more deterrent than an agony of shame." If his two friends advise Niles, and the Master the young man, from love, it is the love of the vulture for its prey; for our part we ask only to be saved from our friends who would save us from ourselves.

Because it is the point of both stories that the two writers are not the same as their work, its quality cannot be presented dramatically, through their character, but can only be baldly stated. In art bald statement makes us contrary. We decide that the Master's novels are much worse and Niles's Broadway comedies much better than they are said to be. This is ungrateful carping—even if it does help to keep our two authors a little longer in the same boat, or rather on the same hillside—for we would not have been able to detect the reason for this technical failure had we not seen their technical successes in the presentation of the artist in relation to his work. And for that matter, we would not have suspected that they could have forced the blessing of comedy out of these two stries had we not watched them on other occasions wrestle with death itself and all the vices, until so blessed.

Despite the example of James's own easiness—when he chose to be easy—in the presence of death, he is taking on every day so much of its stiff eminence that it is unfair and a disservice to any merely living writer to undertake a comparison of him with the dead master. I have not intended any such comparison, or any sort of judgment between Kaufman and him, for that would involve a consideration not only of their likenesses but also of their differences, which are so numerous and extensive as to make Coleridge's warning to the point: "A fondness for judging one work by comparison with others, perhaps altogether of a different class, argues a vulgar taste." ("I don't put them back to back that way," says Corvick, the intelligent critic in "The Figure in the Carpet.") The likenesses between the two men seem to me only the more valuable for being so outnumbered by the differences. We tend to forget the unity of art in the interest of the separate arts, and the relationship of artists in the interest of their separate methods and intentions. Whenever, for all their rich variety, they remind us of each other, they serve to remind us also of ourselves and of the common humanity, their various but single subject, which we share with them. If we can see the likeness of a face in a mountain, can't we see it also in another face?

The Dead Wingman

Seen on the sea, no sign; no sign, no sign
In the black firs and terraces of hills
Ragged in mist. The cone narrows, snow
Glares from the bleak walls of a crater. No.
Again the houses jerk like paper, turn,
And the surf streams by: a port of toys
Is starred with its fires and faces; but no sign.

In the level light, over the fiery shores,
The plane circles stubbornly: the eyes distending
With hatred and misery and longing, stare
Over the blackening ocean for a corpse.
The fires are guttering; the dials fall,
A long dry shudder climbs along his spine,
His fingers tremble; but his hard unchanging stare
Moves unacceptingly: *I have a friend.*

The fires are gray; no star, no sign
Winks from the breathing darkness of the carrier
Where the pilot circles for his wingman; where,
Gliding above the cities' shells, a stubborn eye
Among the coaled and ashen nations, achingly
Tracing the circles of that worn unchanging *No*—
The lives' long war, lost war—the pilot sleeps.

RANDALL JARRELL

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

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The Problem of Influence

FREUDIANISM AND THE LITERARY MIND. By Frederick J. Hoffman. Louisiana State University Press. $4.

FOR some time, one of the self-imposed tasks of academic research has been the investigation of the creative writer's debt to the systematic thinker. And all too often this investigation has proceeded on assumptions which are much too simple. It is usually believed that the creative writer *uses* in his work *the idea* which the systematic thinker *thinks up*, quite as if an idea were a baton that is passed from hand to hand in a relay race, remaining the same in each hand. But Frederick Hoffman, even though he writes as an academic research scholar, understands that the question of influence cannot be reduced to such simplicity. Dr. Hoffman's prose is perhaps not always so lucid as the intelligence which conceived and organized his book—I found myself questioning the formulation of certain statements which I nevertheless thought right in their intention—but his study of the relation of Freud's ideas to literary practice is a work that the student of modern literature will need to know. And every historian of literature and ideas will do well to ponder its theoretical chapter on The Problem of Influence.

Dr. Hoffman knows that an idea is not the unitary, irrefrangible thing that most historians take it to be. He knows that it is modified in its transmission by the kind of cultural environment into which it falls, by the response to the kind of technical or figurative language in which it is expressed, by the power of understanding of those who receive it, and by their own purposes and intention.

Certainly nothing could better illustrate the precarious existence of an idea and the precarious position of the historian of ideas than Freud's psychology. For no system has had to endure more misunderstanding—willed or unconsciously willed—or more intellectual braggadocio from people of normally good and modest intelligence, often while they are themselves making use of Freud's doctrines. It did not lie within the purview of Dr. Hoffman's work to observe that while the investigation of Shakespearean metaphor proceeds along lines that are closely analogous with the Freudian method, so precise a Shakespearean scholar as J. Dover Wilson contemptuously cites a certain *Sigismund* Freud; nor to point to the spectacle of the admirable biographer of Rimbaud and Baudelaire, Enid Starkie, who ritualistically knocks down a Freudian man of straw while she accumulates evidence for the Freudian case. But Dr. Hoffman does deal at length with the kind of understanding of psychoanalysis that was current in Greenwich Village in the days when Floyd Dell was the Freudian authority and friend "psyched" friend—what depths of the past lie in that lost, banal slang word! Those were the days when Ludwig Lewisohn warped Freud to the interests of Zionism and Waldo Frank understood psychoanalysis only when he chose to, misrepresenting it when that suited his doctrinal purpose of the moment, being in this rather like Arthur Koestler, who is a perfect intellectual coquette in the matter.

Of the writers Dr. Hoffman deals with—he wisely limits their number—perhaps only Thomas Mann really understood Freud with the ordinary intelligence we might reasonably expect of a writer, and also used him creatively in a large way and to the good advantage of his art. In this country, Conrad Aiken is notable for the seriousness of his interest; Aiken's understanding of psychoanalysis—not always unexceptionable—did his novels little good but it wonderfully informed certain of his stories and poems.

The case of D. H. Lawrence is interesting not only for Lawrence's inability to understand Freud, but for the light it throws on the methods of critics who lightly use the idea of "influence." Almost from the beginning of his career, Lawrence thought in an essentially Freudian way. Yet he reached his insights without having read Freud and when at last he came to deal with Freudian theory he was shockingly obtuse. Much the same can be said of Sherwood Anderson, who became distressingly coy whenever he spoke of Freud. Yet it is one of the clichés of criticism that both Lawrence and Anderson are the notable examples of Freud's influence on literature.

LIONEL TRILLING

BRIEFER COMMENT

On Looking at Pictures

MOST BOOKS that propose to tell you how to look at pictures turn—usually very early—into expositions of how pictures get to look the way they do. Lionello Venturi's "Painting and Painters: How to Look at a Picture: from Giotto to Chagall" (Scribner's, $3.50) is no exception.

Professor Venturi's conclusion states: "The first impression of a picture is quite vague, and it is only after an analysis of all its components that we may really understand the meaning of each of them and of the picture as a whole." This statement seems to me highly misleading if not completely wrong. The process of looking at a picture is infinitely more complex in scheme than that; it cannot be analyzed into discrete, sequential moments but only, if at all, into logical moments (though logic as such has very little to do with the experience of art). Doesn't one find so many times that the "full meaning" of a picture—i. e., its aesthetic fact—is, at any given visit to it, most fully revealed at the first fresh glance? and that this "meaning" fades progressively as continued examination destroys the unity of impression? With many paintings and pieces of sculpture it is as if you had to catch them by surprise in order to grasp them as wholes—their maximum being packed into the instantaneous shock of sight. Whereas if you plant yourself too firmly before looking at a picture and then gaze at it too long you are likely to end by having it merely gaze blankly back at you.

Professor Venturi is one of the few competent living art critics, and his book gives an expert and philosophical, if sketchy, account of the development of Western painting until the present. Yet books telling you how to look at pictures should generally be read only after you have already learned how by patient experience.

The keystone of Professor Venturi's aesthetics is the somewhat Crocean axiom that "the only standard for . . . appreciation is the personality of the artist"—which is correct but open to serious misinterpretation. The chief difficulty of this book is that it constantly announces the truth in misleading or incomplete terms. There is an inability to round out ex-

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pression that makes for a certain haziness and incoherence which do not, perhaps, characterize the professor's thought itself. CLEMENT GREENBERG

The Free State Vindicated

D. W. BROGAN has written a searching analysis in "The Free State" (Knopf, $2) of the historical and ideological roots of the tragedy of Germany. And in his brilliant little book he compares the bases of representative governments with the authoritarian tenets of the Reich from Frederick William I to V-E Day. Brogan's political values are Jeffersonian—good equipment for a social philosopher.

He finds that the democratic faith with all its implications for a better life is indigenous to the free state while to the Germans it has always been a foreign importation, stunted by their spiritual climate. He shows further—he is always practical—that the free state is now and has always been more efficient. It can, for instance, wage a total war more successfully than the purely military state, for whereas the military state may be able to mobilize the resources of a nation for war it does not create new resources. "It is squeezing the orange, but there is only one orange." The free state, on the other hand, possesses reserves of material and moral power which provide the improvisation, the technical ingenuity, and originality that swing military tides. This war has shown that the balance is weighted by the non-military inventions of civilian technicians. As Brogan says, "the jeep is the child of the flivver, the corvette of the freighter." This section of his book should give pause to Germans and others who still envision the ultimate triumph of the war machine.

Brogan's book is a useful war-time polemic but to the political and social architects of a new Germany it could prove discouraging. For if the free state based on the democratic faith is for the Germans an unnatural concept the prospect for the future is bleak—Brogan argues in effect that a democracy by infusion is illusory. Yet that, it would seem, is our only choice. And an imposed free state would be, for all its imperfections, far preferable to the military state we have all but destroyed. HARVEY J. BRESLER

Democracy in Triplicate

IN "REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY, an Interpretation of the British Civil Service" (Antioch Press, $3.50), J. Donald Kingsley makes a stimulating contribution to the growing discussion of administrative bureaucracy in relation to contemporary social change. About one-third of the book is a meaningful study of the evolution of the British civil service. In it Mr. Kingsley argues that the interests and ideology of the bourgeoisie, coming to dominant political power after 1832, reshaped the civil service from an organ primarily of the aristocracy into an organ of the "middle classes," and that limitations of the civil service are the limitations of those classes. The discussion makes the service come alive.

Out of the historical analysis comes Mr. Kingsley's main thesis: with the shift in effective power from the legislative to the executive branch of government the importance of administrative bureaucracy grows; hence the crucial need for our democratic future "is to develop and maintain representative bureaucracy." This representative character, according to Mr. Kingsley, "must be sought in a common world view and upon a derivative stability in institutional relations . . . in the strength of the officials' commitment to the purposes that the state is undertaking to serve. . . . Bureaucracies, to be democratic, must be representative of the groups they serve . . . must mirror the dominant forces in society." This contains, obviously, an important element of truth, and it is convincingly developed. But it seems to me a conditional and limited truth. Every bureaucracy, except in periods of deep-going class-political change, is representative, in Mr. Kingley's sense, even in a despotic state. It is true, as Mr. Kingsley argues in his incisive analysis of the administrative process, that conflicts between ministers and permanent officials "are not likely to be serious" if both accept the state's purposes. But whether that is democratic or not depends upon whether or not the state is democratic. The bureaucracies of communism and fascism are representative since they promote "the purposes the state is undertaking to serve," "mirror the dominant forces in society," and accept "a common world view." But how democratic are they? A totalitarian regime creates the dominant forces, decides and imposes the state's purposes and world view.

Democracy in the coming world will depend primarily upon the general institutional framework within which representative bureaucracy works—a limited-power state, grass-roots pluralistic economic democracy, checks and balances (which Mr. Kingsley, mistakenly, I think, limits to top-governmental separation of powers) in the form of a variety

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of autonomous social institutions, freedom. There are glimpses of this in Mr. Kingsley's analysis, but they are overwhelmed by his concentration on the administrative process. He dogmatically and disdainfully denies there is a danger of bureaucratic despotism. Ignoring the literature and ideas on this subject, he fails to see that a bureaucracy may develop interests and powers of its own, and he fails to see that where effective economic power is not wielded by classes outside the state but by the state itself the conditions for bureaucratic despotism arise.

Its limitations, as well as its merits, make this a book that should be read. It opens windows on a range of problems that must be understood and solved if the coming world is to be truly democratic.

LEWIS COREY

Apology to F. R. Scott

In reviewing F. R. Scott's book of poems, "Overture," in last week's issue, I called him F. R. Jones. The error is as unexplainable as it is inexcusable. My apologies to Mr. Scott.

F. W. DUPEE

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Music

B. H. HAGGIN

A READER has written me from Germany an interesting comment on the paragraph from Einstein's "Mozart" that I quoted last May. The paragraph was about Mozart's relation to the intellectual currents of his time, and contained the statement that Mozart probably would have had no use for Rousseau, "whose call 'Back to Nature' would have meant very little to him. Mozart was on the side of Voltaire, in spite of the ill-tempered words he pronounced upon the sage of Ferney as an obituary." This leads my correspondent to observe: "I had just finished reading a collection of Mozart letters . . . [which] are astounding, aren't they? And after reading them Einstein's passage was just nonsense. The compulsion some people are under to try to fit literary or musical figures into *our* idea of their time seems so wasteful. These writers want their idols to be on what we now think was the right side of their century. (I recently saw an article in which the author seemed a little hurt that Balzac had 'completely misunderstood' the Paris Commune. Just because this writer does approve of the Paris Commune there is no reason to believe that Balzac didn't know what he was talking about when he said that he didn't approve.) Thus, since Einstein is on the side of Voltaire (good for Voltaire) it is necessary that Mozart be, too. And so the vicious letter he wrote on Voltaire's death becomes 'ill-tempered' —which is absurd. He was *not* on Voltaire's side; he hated Voltaire; his letter on Voltaire's death is really nasty. And why can't the man be given credit for some unpleasant qualities, or for some errors of judgment (if indeed they are errors of judgment)?"

Also, my recent analysis of the review of Einstein's book in the summer issue of *Kenyon Review* has brought this illuminating comment from another reader: "I should say that Mozart's music is rich in sentiment, but not sentimental as Beethoven occasionally is in the slow movements of his weaker works. Indeed I should say that Mozart's very expressiveness, his capacity to arouse the substantive feelings and passions of joy, sorrow, longing, gaiety, precludes the possibility of his being sentimental. Sentimentality is precisely the pose of feeling, the simulation or suggestion of it rather than the thing itself. Sometimes, in Beethoven, one feels that he is trying to create a mood which has no actual occasion or objective correlative (to use T. S. Eliot's phrase) in the music itself. The mood is suggested or 'called to mind' but not embodied. In Mozart one *can't help* being gay or exultant or whatever the music is at the time. In Brahms's serenades one feels that one 'ought' to be gay; in the finale of Mozart's E flat Symphony one *is* gay, deliriously so. That is why the Brahms is so terribly dull in the end, even though the tunes are often quite charming in themselves."

From the very beginning there have been readers of this column who have found it impossible to regard my dislike of much of Brahms's music as a product of rational judgment of experience; and the accusations of insufficient knowledge of the music and of prejudice against it have continued in the face of my statements to the contrary. I have pointed out that since I have expressed my love for certain works of Brahms my dislike of others cannot represent a prejudice against him; I have also pointed out that I acquired an exhaustive knowledge of his music during the dozen or more years when it was for me, every note of it, the greatest of all —until I began to be aware of something in some of the works that made me dislike them. What I began to be aware of was the pose of feeling that my correspondent speaks of which is to be heard in the ranting of the first movement of the First Symphony, the treacly sentimentality of the second movement, the archness of the third—all of which can be heard also in other of Brahms's pretentious large-scale works. And not only pose of feeling, but pose of the entire process of artistic creation—of feeling making itself articulate through the substance, procedures, forms of an artistic medium. The very first work that I disliked was the Sonata Opus 99 for cello and piano: here for the first time I became aware of a mere filling out of formal pattern by arbitrary manipulation of synthetic substance—of a form of expression without real expression. And in time I came to dislike the other works of Brahms in which pumped-up attitudes are communicated through synthetically contrived large structures—as against music which communicates something genuinely felt that has dictated the substance and its manipulation into a form.

Now that I think of it, that pose of feeling and of artistic expression of feeling is one of the things I have heard and disliked in the music of Shostakovitch, of Villa-Lobos, of Roy Harris, of William Schuman, and of others like them.

After all this had been written Einstein's book came up once more. This column's favorite correspondent, returned from war, listened with me to Mozart's String Quintet K. 515; and when we were talking about the things that were so astounding in the minuet

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movement—the somber strangeness of the Minuet, the first part of the Trio, the violent intensities of its middle part—I showed him what Einstein had found important about it: "The following Minuet is more of a *tempo di minuetto*, with a Trio in the subdominant, which itself grows into complete song-form." Later we listened to the last few minutes of "The Marriage of Figaro," leading up to and ending with the *Contessa, perdono* passage; and when I lifted the pickup off the record after the solemn octaves that gently ease us from the superearthly exaltation of that passage down to this earth again, he sat silent for a long time; then, beginning to laugh, he said: "Let's see what Einstein has to say about it." So we looked, and found that Einstein had nothing to say about it. And looking further we found that he did have things like this to say: "It has been observed with truth that in Susanna there is a bit of Colombina left, in Figaro of Arlecchino; that Don Bartolo and Marcellina are pure *buffo* figures. But the Countess? The Count? Cherubino? The tiny roles of Barbarina and her father, the gardener Antonio? Basilio the schemer? It took courage to see the *opera buffa* possibilities in this work and to realize them—courage that Mozart and da Ponte can have gathered only from pieces like those of Bertati and Casti." At which point we shut the book with a bang—for good.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

Nazis Still in Command

Dear Sirs: Yesterday we were relieved of the job of running a P. O. W. enclosure with 7,000 P. O. W.'s of which we had been in charge for two weeks. The camp had been running for a week or so when a German lieutenant expressed the wish to be brought to the Russian authorities. Well, P. O. W.'s had come to us with the oddest and craziest requests; this one, too, could have been dismissed with a laugh. But something in that man demanded confidence and respect. He opened our eyes to a lot of things in the camp that didn't agree with the principles for which so many Allied soldiers had given their lives. As in most P. O. W. camps the German officers still retained their grip upon the rank and file, a lot of "cliques" had been set up, and an honest anti-Nazi didn't have a chance. In addition to the guards there were only seven of us, all German-speaking, N. C. O.'s to carry on the administration of a camp of 7,000; and we would have saved ourselves a lot of work if we had decided to leave things as they were. However, there was that German lieutenant P. O. W. with the single-track mind, whose one purpose was to wipe out fascism in whatever form it appeared. And there was also our conviction that we mustn't let these things happen if we could change them.

So we seven non-coms, our officer, and that man had a talk one evening. This is what we decided and we carried it out the following morning. At 7 o'clock we gave orders to the officers to stand by with their baggage. At the same time the men were told to stand by for an important announcement. Well, the officers who, as we had found out, were instigating subversive activities, were led away. Those who had tried hard to have the men do close-order drill and those who had stolen rations from their own men were locked up in the cage. Now we had 7,000 men without officers, without leaders, and you know what a German is without a leader. These 7,000 men were now broken up into seven separate groups, and every one of us had 1,000 men staring at him waiting and wondering what was going to happen next. Well, here is a rough idea of what each of us said to his group:

> This morning we have freed you from your officers. For six years these men have mistreated you. For six years or longer they have stolen from you and from every decent German and now, when they shared your fate of captivity, they thought they could continue that life. . . . That has changed as of today. I have taken over the battalion of 1,000 men. Together we will choose ten Company Commanders who have your confidence and mine. Neither I nor these ten men have been to the War Academy in Potsdam, nor to any S. S. Oberfuehrerschule. But I am sure we'll be able to run the battalion as efficiently as if we wore those silver epaulettes.

Never had I seen so much satisfaction as in those men after I gave them the news. Every company was asked whom they would suggest. In addition I asked who felt capable of leading a group of 100 men and I found out all the men who had ever been in trouble with the German Army for "crimes" like "Zersetzung der Wehrkraft," listening to foreign radio stations, etc. I picked my ten men from these groups and today I can say that none of them has let us down.

But here's the payoff. While I was writing these lines I was told to report to a meeting. The orders from Army HQ were in. Everything we did in these last two weeks will have to be undone. We will have to put German officers back in charge of the companies. We will have to appoint German Battalion Commanders in our own places. We are supposed to supervise them only. But this is impossible. Here every one of us is up against eleven politically indoctrinated Nazi bastards who should be shot rather than put in charge of German people. Now the old game of intrigue and fake and forgery will be continued. German officers laugh about "these silly Americans." And the men who were company commanders and who cooperated with us, what can they expect from these officers? In a few days these company commanders had uncovered 182 former members of the Waffen S.S., 12 former members of the Allgemeine S.S., some members since 1932 and 1933. SERVICEMAN

Somewhere in Germany,

[This letter reached us through the Newsletter for a Democratic Austria

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which also sent us the following information: The June 8 issue of the *Kaertner Neueste Nachrichten*, a newspaper published under the auspices of the British Occupation Authorities, reports that the Military Government is directing men in agricultural work in Carinthia. These men, Austrian P. O. W.'s, will be commanded by their own officers, who are mostly German, and "who are responsible to the Allied Command for the conduct of their men." This means that Austrian P. O. W.'s, on Austrian soil, are often being officered by Germans and owe them obedience.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

The Errors of Weimar

Dear Sirs: I wish to take exception to your editorial note on Dr. Gerhard Anschuetz in *The Nation* of August 11. Unintentionally, I trust, you have done a grave injustice to an honest and fearless man.

Let me first correct two major errors that you (and the source of your information) committed in your short note. Dr. Anschuetz never was—nor ever claimed to be—the author of the Weimar Constitution. Its real father was the late Dr. Hugo Preuss, a democratic scholar-politician, who was the first Minister of the Interior of the German Republic. Dr. Anschuetz's claim to fame rests with the facts that he was the leading expert on constitutional law of pre-Hitler Germany and that he wrote the outstanding commentary on the Weimar Constitution.

Your second error concerns the paragraph of the Constitution which Anschuetz is said to have criticized. It characterizes the reliability of the newspaper interview on which you base your remarks, that it speaks of paragraph 54, although anybody who ever read a book on modern German history knows that it was paragraph 48 which conferred the fateful emergency powers on the President of the German Republic. It is unthinkable that Dr. Anschuetz would have misquoted the most frequently discussed article of the Constitution.

In general, I hold no brief for scholars and politicians who remained in Hitler Germany. But there are exceptions, and Gerhard Anschuetz is one of them. I always considered him the clearest constitutional thinker I ever encountered in Germany and one of the rather few university professors who did not hesitate to stand up for their democratic convictions. As you say, he spent ten years of Hitler's reign in a Nazi prison. I do not think that he deserved a slur from you. Your note would have made more sense, if it had ended with the words: ". . . That there were a few other things wrong with Weimar Germany besides paragraph 48, and that one of them was too *few*—far, far too *few*—Dr. Anschuetzes." FELIX E. HIRSCH

Annandale-on-Hudson, N. Y.,
August 14

[When *The Nation* said that one of the things wrong with Weimar Germany was "too many—far, far too many—Dr. Anschuetzes" we did not intend a slur on his character. Nor do we doubt that he stood up for his democratic convictions. What the comment tried to say, perhaps too obliquely, was simply that too many honest democrats in pre-Hitler Germany thought you could sweep back the Nazi tide with a broom made of constitutional provisions and other legal formulas. If more of them had realized from the start that what they faced was not legitimate political opposition but a fascist revolution, to be met by the united forces of all the left and democratic elements in Germany, Hitler would not have come to power and Dr. Anschuetz would not have spent ten years in a Nazi prison. As for our other errors, they are inexcusable. We relied on a dispatch in the New York *Times* instead of turning to several available reference books in *The Nation's* library. We should have learned by this time that even the *Times* is not infallible. —EDITORS THE NATION.]

Would Conscription Pay?

Dear Sirs: Conscription or Enlistment? by Militaris seems to me the most reasonable discussion of the subject that I have seen. My opinion may be largely personal; but the article emphasizes most temperately what I would emphasize. If we are to have another war within five years after this one ends, we may well continue conscription. If we are not to have another war for fifteen or twenty years, conscription would be largely futile. Unless there is a rather immediate prospect of war, it is almost impossible to keep up the necessary interest in military training, for large numbers of conscripts.

GUSTAVUS S. PAINE

Southbury, Conn., July 15

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

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Crossword Puzzle No. 125

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

1 Choose to be grateful for someone in *Vanity Fair*
6 Sir Walter Scott's black one had several aliases
9 Is a lass (anag.)
10 Part of a car worn 'round the neck?
11 This Japanese fish is nearly all tail
12 Chant in harmony
13 Edible part of an alligator
15 Poem whose second half is spoken
16 Hole in favor with golfers who hit a long ball (hyphen, 3-3)
18 Punctual (two words, 2 and 4)
20 A topping thing for one's retirement
23 Not an odd-sounding Russian
24 Spanish wine shop
25 A big fellow
28 Tyrannical schoolmaster in *David Copperfield*
29 A little fellow
30 Sonya appears in a medieval peasant's jacket
31 A game bird

DOWN

1 "Fixed like a ----- on his peculiar spot, To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot"
2 He of the lean and hungry look, in *Julius Caesar*
3 What the Scotsman had inscribed on his tombstone (four words, 4, 2, 2, 2)
4 A police dog, perhaps
5 "O.K. I'm on!" (anag.)
6 Take off
7 Hal and Lila join in an old salutation (hyphen, 3-4)
8 Bright and companionable, if a little unsteady about the room
14 One who ascends by this is likely to have sway (two words, 4 and 6)
15 Parts from capital
17 Guide to the North
19 *Gorboduc*, by Thomas Sackville, was the first regular one written in English (It was a bit dull)
21 Tagged
22 Not an outstanding success as a shepherdess (hyphen, 2-4)
26 "O sleep, O gentle sleep, Nature's soft -----!"
27 He and his brother miller, Bone, were more than Flesh and Blood could stand

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 124

ACROSS:—1 MOUTH; 4 BLAST; 7 INCLUDE; 10 GAMIN; 11 EIDAM, 12 DREAMER; 13 TEND; 16 HERR; 18 ASIDE; 20 WHEEZE; 21 ENTRAP; 22 RELIEF; 24 BOWERY; 25 CAIRN; 26 TSAR; 28 TURF; 31 BAILIES; 33 POKER; 34 PHLOX; 35 AMASSER; 36 YAWED; 37 YATES.

DOWN:—1 MIGHT; 2 UNMAN; 3 HIND; 4 BEER; 5 ADDLE; 6 TAMAR; 8 CREASE; 9 UNMADE; 14 EDWARDS; 15 DWELLER; 16 HERBERT; 17 REPAYER; 18 AZTEC; 19 END ON; 23 FATIMA; 24 BRAINS; 26 TIPSY; 27 ASKEW; 29 UNLIT; 30 FOXES; 31 BRAD; 32 SPRY.

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